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Gerrymandering & Justiciability: The Political Question
Doctrine After Rucho v. Common Cause
G. MICHAEL PARSONS
In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Supreme Court held that partisan-gerrymandering
claims present political questions beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The
decision marks the first time that a majority of the Court has used the political
question doctrine to dismiss a claim based on the supposed unmanageability of legal
standards alone. Despite this development being essential to the Court’s holding, its
significance went largely unexplored and uncontested.
This Article deconstructs Rucho’s articulation and application of the political
question doctrine and makes two contributions.
First, the Article disentangles the political question doctrine from neighboring
justiciability doctrines. The result is a set of substantive principles that should guide
federal courts as they exercise a range of routine judicial functions—remedial,
adjudicative, and interpretive. Rather than unrealistically attempting to draw crisp
jurisdictional boundaries between exercises of “political” and “judicial” power, the
political question doctrine should seek to moderate their inevitable (and frequent)
clash. Standing doctrine should continue to guide courts in determining whether they
have authority over a case involving a political question. But the political question
doctrine should guide courts in determining how to navigate areas of overlapping
constitutional authority covered by the question.
Second, the Article challenges the assumption that manageability can and should
provide a standalone test of jurisdiction. Rucho’s “manageability exception” to
Article III actively undermines the separation of powers principles it purports to
protect. Treating manageability as an independent test of jurisdiction invites federal
courts to opine about abstract questions not presented by the case or controversy
before them and to abdicate their duty to decide cases properly before them without
any constitutional command to the contrary. Rucho offers a profound illustration.
Chief Justice Roberts asserts that partisan-gerrymandering claims are not
“resolvable according to legal principles,” but his opinion fails to set out any legal
standard rooted in the Constitution for deciding when a claim is or is not
“manageable.” The result is a decision as hollow as it is hypocritical.
This Article proposes a new approach to the political question doctrine, explains
where the Court went wrong in Rucho, and explores what it could mean for the future
of partisan-gerrymandering claims and justiciability doctrine alike.
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Georgetown University Law Center; A.B. 2008, Davidson College. I am thankful to Professors
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INTRODUCTION
In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Supreme Court held that “[p]artisan gerrymandering
claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.”1 Scholarly
commentary surrounding the decision focused (understandably) on the consequences
for redistricting law writ large and the implications for partisan-gerrymandering
claims in state courts.2 Overlooked in all the commotion, however, is what Rucho
means for the political question doctrine itself.

1. 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2485, 2506–07 (2019).
2. See, e.g., Joey Fishkin, Rucho: A Sinkhole Dangerously Close to the House, ELECTION
L. BLOG (July 1, 2019, 7:38 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=105928 [https://perma.cc/CP
Q3-MUM8]; Keith Gaddie, After Rucho: Fifty Thickets, ELECTION L. BLOG (July 3, 2019, 7:00
AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=105918 [https://perma.cc/7TVS-A6ZL]; Rebecca Green,
A Spade Is a Spade, ELECTION L. BLOG (July 5, 2019, 7:00 AM), http://electionlawblog.org

2020]

GER R Y MA ND ERI NG & JUS TI CIAB I LI TY

1297

The modern political question doctrine3 was born in Baker v. Carr alongside the
justiciability of the individual vote-dilution claim.4 The doctrine purports to establish
a “narrow exception” to the Supreme Court’s duty under Article III “to decide cases
properly before it, even those it ‘would gladly avoid.’”5 When a case involves “a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it,” the Court is said to lack the authority to decide the dispute.6
Never in its history, however, had the Court withheld jurisdiction over a case
based on the supposed “unmanageability” of legal standards alone.7 That is until
Rucho.8 Given this new development, one might imagine a robust debate unfolding
between the majority and dissenting opinions over the meaning, shape, and scope of
the doctrine. Instead, the Justices simply assumed that manageability constitutes an
independent test of jurisdiction and debated its application to the case before them.9
The Rucho majority’s decision to turn away political-gerrymandering claims was
deeply disappointing, but the Court’s unanimous, uncritical acceptance and
extension of the modern political question doctrine in Rucho was unfortunate in its
own right. The doctrine (if it can even be called that) is little more than an amalgam
of tangentially related concepts and cases—a repository of loose odds and ends.10
Rucho represents a missed opportunity to bring clarity to political-gerrymandering
and political question case law.
In this Article, I deconstruct Rucho’s articulation and application of the modern
political question doctrine and propose a new approach. The Article makes two
primary contributions.
First, it disentangles those aspects of the political question doctrine that do unique
doctrinal work from those aspects that are merely borrowed from neighboring
separation of powers principles. Doing so demonstrates how the purposes of the
political question doctrine would be better served by (a) letting adjacent legal
doctrines exclusively fulfill some of the aims currently ascribed to the political

/?p=106 071 [https://perma.cc/MBG8-8EHF].
3. I use the term “modern political question doctrine” throughout to refer to the doctrine
that the Supreme Court currently employs. This can be distinguished from the “traditional
political question doctrine” that appears in the Court’s pre-Baker political question cases. See
Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1908 (2015); John Harrison, The Political Question Doctrines, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 460–
68 (2017); infra Section III.B.
4. 369 U.S. 186, 208–37 (1962).
5. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I), 566 U.S. 189, 194–95 (2012) (quoting Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)).
6. Id. at 195 (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)).
7. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2509, 2515 (2019) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
8. See id.
9. See generally id.
10. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 244 (2002).
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question doctrine,11 and (b) imposing distinct substantive (rather than jurisdictional)
obligations on the judiciary depending on the type of judicial power involved.12
This is not to say that “political questions” do not exist—they do. As Professor
John Harrison observes, “political questions” arise when “one component of the
government is called on to perform a function more associated with the other.”13 But
different judicial functions raise distinct political questions.14 And the appropriate
doctrinal response depends on the type of question asked: remedial, adjudicative, or
interpretive.
None of these political questions, however, justify a categorical exception to the
federal courts’ jurisdiction over cases or controversies otherwise properly before
them.15 Standing doctrine should guide courts in determining whether they have
authority over a case involving a political question.16 The political question doctrine,
on the other hand, should guide courts in determining how to navigate the area of
overlapping constitutional authority covered by the question.17 Rather than
unrealistically attempting to draw a crisp jurisdictional boundary between exercises
of “political” and “judicial” power, the doctrine should seek to moderate their
inevitable clash.
Second, I argue that the stand-alone “manageability” exception to Article III
jurisdiction found in Rucho actively undermines the separation of powers principles
it purports to protect. Conditioning jurisdiction on manageability alone invites
federal courts to opine about abstract questions not presented by the case or
controversy before them (e.g., is this constitutional right inherently unsusceptible to
legal standards?)18 and to abdicate their duty to decide cases properly before them
without any clear constitutional instruction to the contrary.19
In Rucho, Chief Justice Roberts asserts that partisan-gerrymandering claims are
an exception because they are not “resolvable according to legal principles” and that
the Court lacks jurisdiction “in the absence of a constitutional directive or legal
standards to guide [the Court] in the exercise of [its] authority.”20 But that accusation
is as empty as it is ironic. For while the dissent sets out plain First Amendment and
equal protection standards for adjudicating partisan-gerrymandering claims, the
majority fails to articulate any clear constitutional directive or distinct legal standard
for deciding when a claim is or is not “manageable” under the political question
doctrine.21
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the modern political question
doctrine, its departure from the principles that animated Baker v. Carr, and its

11. See infra Sections II.A, II.B, III.A.
12. See infra Sections II.C, III.B.
13. Harrison, supra note 3, at 505.
14. See infra Sections II.C, III.B.
15. See infra Part I.
16. See infra Sections II.A, III.A.
17. See infra Sections II.C, III.B.
18. See infra Section III.A.
19. See infra Section IV.A.
20. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494, 2508 (2019) (emphasis in original).
21. See infra Part IV. Compare Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2516–17 (Kagan, J., dissenting), with
id. at 2493–94 (majority opinion).
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increasingly untenable place within the Supreme Court’s broader Article III
jurisprudence.
Parts II, III, and IV each address a distinct aspect of judicial power and examine
the political questions that arise with each exercise of power: remedial, adjudicative,
and interpretive. Each Part untangles the role of adjacent doctrines, proposes how
federal courts should respond to each type of political question, and explores what
those doctrines might look like in practice. The Court’s political-gerrymandering
cases provide a critical lens along the way for exploring the purposes and contours
of each doctrine.
I.

THE MODERN POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

The modern political question doctrine purports to stand for the proposition that
there are certain categories of constitutional claims that the federal courts are wholly
without jurisdiction to adjudicate because one (or more) factors render the issue to
be resolved a “political question.”22 On this reading, courts lack jurisdiction under
Article III when a claim involves:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.23
These six factors were first assembled in Baker v. Carr, where Justice Brennan
catalogued the Court’s prior political question cases in an attempt to identify their
common attributes.24
At the time, however, the factors that Justice Brennan compiled were descriptive
more than anything else—a survey to distinguish the Court’s political question cases
and demonstrate that the vote-dilution claim before the Court had all the trappings of
a normal adjudicable dispute.25 Justice Brennan recognizes the “nonjusticiability” of

22. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494; Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 194–95 (2012); Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Sometimes, . . . the judicial
department has no business entertaining [a] claim of unlawfulness—because the question is
entrusted to one of the political branches or involves no judicially enforceable rights. Such
questions are said to be ‘nonjusticiable,’ or ‘political questions.’” (citations omitted)); 13C
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3534 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER] (“[P]olitical-question
doctrine purports to establish that a particular question is beyond judicial competence, no
matter who raises it, how immediate the interests affected, or how burning the controversy.”).
23. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
24. Id. at 210.
25. See id. at 208–37.
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political questions as “primarily a function of the separation of powers,”26 but he
does not treat justiciability as a question of Article III jurisdiction.27 (Indeed, Justice
Brennan cites cases involving political questions in which the Court retained
jurisdiction.28) Like many other separation of powers inquiries,29 the inquiry in Baker
appears to be substantive—not jurisdictional.
Nor did Justice Brennan endorse a categorical political question inquiry that
would place whole classes of constitutional claims beyond the reach of federal courts.
“Deciding whether a matter [is] committed by the Constitution to another branch of
government,” Justice Brennan wrote, requires a “discriminating inquiry into the
precise facts and posture of the particular case.”30 Justice Brennan resisted any
“blanket rule” and emphasized the necessity of a “case-by-case inquiry” and a
“discriminating analysis of the particular question posed.”31
Only over time did the Baker factors mutate into what we see today: a doctrine
that allegedly derives from Article III’s case-or-controversy language,32 denies a
court authority to resolve the case before it,33 and consists of six “independent tests”34
to identify the relevant class of constitutional claims that are outside of the Court’s
jurisdiction and entrusted exclusively to the political branches. 35
So understood, the modern political question doctrine is wildly out of place.
Under Article III, the judiciary has an obligation to decide cases properly before it,36

26. Id. at 210.
27. See Harrison, supra note 3, at 497–98. Compare Baker, 369 U.S. at 204–08
(discussing standing), with id. at 208–37 (discussing justiciability).
28. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 214 (citing The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700 (1871),
as an example of the Court deferring to the “political departments’ determination of dates of
hostilities’ beginning and ending” in “private litigation”).
29. See, e.g., Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018) (“The separation of powers,
among other things, prevents Congress from exercising the judicial power.”); Bank Markazi
v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 (2016) (invoking Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803), for the rule that Congress “may not usurp a court’s power to interpret and
apply the law to the [circumstances] before it” (alteration in original)); Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (invoking Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792),
for the rule that Congress may not “vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials
of the Executive Branch”); id. at 219 (holding that Congress may not “retroactively
comman[d] the federal courts to reopen final judgments”).
30. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211, 211, 217 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 211, 215.
32. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341–42, 352
(2006); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
33. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012); see also 13C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
22, § 3534.3 n.9. (3d ed. 2008 Supp. 2019) (collecting cases).
34. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) (plurality opinion).
35. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494 (2019) (citing Vieth, 541 U.S.
at 277).
36. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 194; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821);
see also Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 274 (2008).
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even those with “significant political overtones.”37 The modern doctrine is said to
constitute “a narrow exception” to that constitutional responsibility, 38 but why?
Unlike most jurisdictional doctrines, which articulate the conditions that must be
satisfied for a court to decide a legal issue, the modern political question doctrine
purports to bar federal courts from entertaining certain constitutional cases at all.39
Cases invoking the Guarantee Clause,40 certain cases implicating foreign affairs,41 or
cases raising partisan-gerrymandering claims42 are all supposedly beyond the reach
of federal courts. Such categorical denials of jurisdiction are difficult enough to
explain as interpretations of the Constitution under Baker’s first factor.43 They
become even more inexplicable under Baker’s five nontextual factors.
The pliability of these criteria has “fostered a famous dialogue on the desirability
of a ‘discretionary’ power to avoid decision of issues courts might simply wish to
avoid.”44 According to Professor Rachel Barkow, “[c]ourts have used this prudential
theory to delegate judicial authority to political actors (even when the Constitution
does not contemplate such a delegation) and to avoid deciding controversial cases.” 45
Yet, this “prudential theory” is not one that the Roberts Court seems willing to
embrace46—at least not explicitly.47 Discretionary jurisdiction sits uneasily with the
Court’s power of judicial review, for “the power of judicial review rests ultimately
upon the constitutional duty of the judiciary ‘to say what the law is.’”48 If the Court
can choose to decline jurisdiction in one case for extraconstitutional reasons, then it

37. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
38. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 195.
39. Grove, supra note 3, at 1909; see also Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the
Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 441, 456 (2004) (noting that the
“categorical approach” to the political question doctrine places entire categories of
constitutional cases “wholly within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress and the President”).
40. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 n.17 (1980); Colegrove v.
Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon,
223 U.S. 118, 140–51 (1912).
41. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see Seidman, supra note 39, at 455–56,
456 n.61.
42. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019).
43. See Seidman, supra note 39, at 445–59 (discussing how purportedly jurisdictional
grants of interpretive authority are functionally equivalent to substantive interpretations on the
merits).
44. 13C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, § 3534.3 (3d ed. 2008 Supp. 2019). Compare
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959), with Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
45. Barkow, supra note 10, at 253.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 51–57.
47. See Seidman, supra note 39, at 459–65 (“[I]f the passive virtues are to serve their
intended function, they can do so only by misleading the country.”).
48. Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis,
75 YALE L.J. 517, 518 (1966) (emphasis in original) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
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can choose to decline jurisdiction in any case.49 This would hardly be a “narrow
exception” to the interpretive obligations imposed by Article III.50
As a result, the Supreme Court has pivoted away from recognizing prudential
bases for declining jurisdiction in recent decades, increasingly justifying its decisions
in constitutional terms.51 In standing doctrine, the Court has moved its bar on
“generalized grievances” from prudential to constitutional grounds;52 it has
reconceptualized its “zone of interests” inquiry to pose a traditional question of
interpretation;53 and it appears poised to recategorize its limitations on “third-party
standing” as well.54
The political question doctrine also reflects this trend towards explaining
jurisdictional decisions in strictly constitutional terms.55 Over time, the Justices have
observed that at least some of Baker’s factors seem more “prudential” than
“constitutional.”56 The Court has pared these back accordingly, leaving only the
“textual commitment” and “judicially manageable” factors in place in recent
decades.57
But whittling down the number of factors misses the point: none of the nontextual
factors (manageability included) should be considered “independent tests” of
subject-matter jurisdiction as Justice Scalia claimed in Vieth.58 At most, the Baker
factors provide practical and functional indicia from which a court might infer when,
how, and the extent to which the Constitution entrusts an issue to a coordinate
branch.59 Just as Baker’s first factor (a “textually demonstrable constitutional

49. See id. at 519.
50. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012).
51. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127, 127
n.3 (2014). See generally Joel S. Nolette, Last Stand for Prudential Standing? Lexmark and
Its Implications, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 227 (2018).
52. See Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 127 n.3.
53. See id. at 127.
54. See id. at 127 n.3 (“The limitations on third-party standing are harder to classify . . .
[but] consideration of that doctrine’s proper place in the standing firmament can await
another day.”).
55. See Nolette, supra note 51, at 246–48.
56. Compare Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012) (only discussing the first two factors),
with id. at 204 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (deeming the final three factors “prudential”), and
id. at 212 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (deeming the final four factors “prudential”).
57. See id. at 195 (majority opinion); Nixon v. United States (Walter Nixon), 506 U.S.
224, 228 (1993); Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The
Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203,
1213 (2002) (“[I]t seems fair to say that the only real components of the doctrine are the first
two: a textually demonstrable commitment to the political branches and the lack of judicially
manageable standards.”).
58. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) (plurality opinion).
59. See Wechsler, supra note 44, at 7–8 (“[A]ll the doctrine can defensibly imply is that
the courts are called upon to judge whether the Constitution has committed to another agency
of government the autonomous determination of the issue raised, a finding that itself requires
an interpretation. . . . What is explicit in the trial of an impeachment or, to take another case,
the seating or expulsion of a Senator or Representative may well be found to be implicit in
others.”) (footnote omitted).
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commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department”60) is sure evidence
that the legislature or executive was meant to have the final word on a question, the
five nontextual Baker factors should be viewed as probative interpretive signals, not
stand-alone jurisdictional standards. This means the “manageability” factor is no
more or less “prudential” than any of the other nontextual factors.61
In other words, the Court should not ask whether a factor applies and use that
answer to deny jurisdiction. Instead, it should ask what the presence of a factor
reveals about the meaning of the Constitution and use that answer to make
substantive decisions about how to exercise its powers in coordination with the
powers of another department within the context of the case before it.62 For example,
“the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question”63 does not give the courts free-roving discretion to
decline jurisdiction on a wholesale basis. Rather, it is probative of whether resolving
a discrete issue in a case would require the court to exercise a function better suited
(or more explicitly entrusted) to another actor.64
By holding for the first time that manageability constitutes a freestanding test of
jurisdiction, Rucho marks the final stage in the modern political question doctrine’s
metamorphosis. The decision reveals as well as any the doctrine’s utter vacuity.
Rucho reads as an homage to reasoned decision-making, legal principles, and
constitutional fidelity, culminating in a strong rebuke of partisan-gerrymandering
claims: “this is not law.”65 But the Chief doth protest too much.66 As a jurisdictional
standard, manageability fails to provide the very touchstone of judicial power that
Rucho demands: decision-making “according to legal principles.”67 Determining
what is “manageable” boils down to prudence, pragmatics, and politics—not law. 68
This is the extraconstitutional essence of the modern political question doctrine.69
To cover its tracks, the Rucho majority peddles demonstrable falsehoods,70 relies
upon conclusory arguments,71 and muscles its way to a decision “in the absence of
[any] constitutional directive or legal standards to guide . . . the exercise of [its]
authority.”72 All of this to avoid doing what Article III required: resolve a properly
presented dispute involving a cognizable constitutional harm.73

60. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
61. See Ron Park, Note, Is the Political Question Doctrine Jurisdictional or Prudential?,
6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 255, 273 (2016).
62. See, e.g., Walter Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–29 (noting that the first two principles are
“not completely separate” because “the lack of judicially manageable standards may
strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate
branch”).
63. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
64. See infra Section III.B.
65. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019).
66. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2.
67. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494 (emphasis in original).
68. See infra Section IV.A.2.
69. See Seidman, supra note 39, at 459–65.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 539–546.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 470–489.
72. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508.
73. See infra Section III.A (discussing how the Rucho plaintiffs presented a cognizable
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A better path was available. Making sense of the political question doctrine could
have offered insights that would have allowed the majority to more honestly engage
with the questions at the heart of the political-gerrymandering debate.
The three Parts that follow unwind the concepts and cases behind the modern
doctrine to isolate its distinct variants, explore their legitimate separation of powers
purposes, and identify the ways in which the modern doctrine unnecessarily preempts
(and undermines) those purposes.
II. JUDICIAL POWER AND POLITICAL REMEDIES
Political questions occasionally arise when the federal courts are called to exercise
equitable power to remedy a constitutional violation.74 In exploring and explaining
the limits upon judicial power posed by such situations, the Court has variously
deployed standing doctrine, the equitable remedies doctrine, and the political
question doctrine.75
When and why each applies, however, remains unclear. Across all three doctrines,
the Court has vacillated between ascribing the limits on judicial power to the
historical role76 of the “Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster”77 and
attributing them to the textual allocation of powers and functions78 in the
Constitution. These often align, for “history and tradition offer a meaningful guide”

constitutional harm sufficient to support standing according to requirements set out in Gill v.
Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018)).
74. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549.
552 (1946); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 475–76 (1903).
75. See infra Sections II.A, II.B, II.C.
76. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion) (discussing
the political question doctrine and stating that the judicial power vested by Article III “is the
power to act in the manner traditional for English and American courts”); Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 319 (1999) (discussing equitable remedies
and asking “whether the relief . . . requested here was traditionally accorded by courts of
equity”); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (discussing standing
and stating, “We have always taken [the case-or-controversy requirement] to mean cases and
controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.”
(emphasis added)); see also Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2493–94 (citing standing cases in a political
question case for the proposition that “federal courts can address only questions ‘historically
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process’” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 95 (1968))).
77. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
78. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88 (1995) (discussing equitable remedies
and stating that “federal courts in devising a remedy must take into account the interests of
state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution”);
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) (denying standing because “[t]he Constitution, after
all, assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to ‘take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)); Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 6,
12 (holding controversy to be a nonjusticiable political question because U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 16, “vests in Congress the power: ‘[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining,
the Militia’”).
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to understanding what the “judicial Power” of Article III encompasses.79 Yet this
mode of analysis fails when the text of the Constitution pulls in a direction
unimaginable to “the courts of Westminster.” Here the Court must grapple with the
shape and substance of equitable power in a different system founded on different
principles.
“Equity evolved in England as a natural outgrowth of the King’s inherent power
and duty to do justice.”80 Because the King was the “fountain[] of justice,” he “could
grant relief when ordinary legal institutions were insufficient, unwilling, or unable to
do so.”81 As more people sought relief from the King via his Chancellor, a “Court of
Chancery gradually developed around the Chancellor to facilitate his role.”82
Having traded the supremacy of a king for the supremacy of the Constitution and
having merged the equity power into the “judicial power,”83 we should not be
surprised when the historical role of the “chancellor” provides less meaningful
guidance over time.84 As Professor Herbert Wechsler predicted, a common law
constitutional system that grows through gradual adjudication and interpretation will
inevitably lead to a proliferation and multiplicity of legitimate claims (and remedies)
rooted in (and demanded by) the constitutional text.85 This is especially unavoidable
in a modern administrative state, where federal, state, and local authorities—all of
whom are accountable to the supreme law of the land—are involved in various facets
of everyday life.86
The Supreme Court’s difficulty in grappling with the scope and form of structural
remedies over the last half century reflects this tension. In Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown II), the Court sought to remedy the widespread violation of
constitutional rights by government actors across hundreds of jurisdictions, many of
whom were not open to complying in good faith with the Court’s interpretation of
the Constitution.87 What is the proper role of the “chancellor” in such a situation?88
In a tripartite, federal constitutional government, justice was not designed to flow
from a single source but rather from the confluence of individually guaranteed rights

79. Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273–74 (2008).
80. Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 58 B.C. L. REV. 217, 225 (2018).
81. Id. (alteration in original).
82. Id. at 226.
83. See id. at 224–31.
84. Cf. Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REV. 827, 829–
31 (1957) (describing the historical origins of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in England
and the doctrine’s initially uncritical acceptance by federal courts in the United States despite
the different underlying government structures and justifications).
85. Wechsler, supra note 44, at 7.
86. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J.
2537, 2556 (1998) (discussing “the original presupposition that the Constitution would be
implemented through an evolving remedial system”).
87. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
88. Ironically, the Court has drawn much of its modern articulation of “traditional” equity
principles from the middle-to-late nineteenth century and early twentieth century—“when
those rules were most systematically expounded”—rather than from the preconstitutional,
revolutionary, or founding period. Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity,
68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1022 (2015). These sources similarly predate the Court’s decision in
Brown II.
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and politically accountable powers. When these forces stand in tension, should one
simply forfeit to the other? Even Justice Thomas—an ardent originalist and strict
critic of the federal courts’ equitable powers—acknowledges that the courts cannot
let such a violation go unrectified.89
By teasing out and clarifying the purposes of each doctrine, the Court can more
coherently distinguish when and how structural principles delimit judicial remedial
authority. Standing doctrine, for example, bars a court from taking jurisdiction over
a case when the remedy requested by a party would have no more than a “purely
speculative” effect on the injury alleged in the pleadings.90 On the other hand, the
equitable remedies doctrine constrains the scope of a court’s remedial authority at
the conclusion of a case, confining the equitable power to those actions reasonably
necessary to resolve and conclude the case.91 Both of these boundaries can be
understood to derive from Article III, which confines the judicial power to cases and
controversies.92
The political question doctrine is different. And exploring how that doctrine has
applied in the context of equitable remedies brings us to the first of three contextspecific variants of the political question doctrine: the “political remedies doctrine.”
The political remedies doctrine arises when executive or legislative actors at the
federal, state, or local level violate the constitution in a way that requires the federal
courts to exercise their equitable powers in a broad or structural manner overlapping
with traditionally executive or legislative functions. Professor John Harrison has
identified this doctrine as a distinct strand of the political question doctrine, arguing
that federal courts dismiss claims when the remedy necessary would require a court
to “make the type of policy decisions normally entrusted to political actors” and
would cause the court to “require or forbid some conduct that is itself legally
indifferent.”93
By surfacing this unique branch of the political question doctrine and
demonstrating how different types of political questions arise in response to different
exercises of judicial authority, Professor Harrison illuminates important nuances that
the modern doctrine elides. Yet, the dividing line proposed by Harrison with respect
to the political remedies doctrine is not so neat. In many cases, the Supreme Court
has allowed courts to exercise broad equitable powers in ways that overlap with
legislative and executive functions and that impact legally indifferent conduct.94
Rather than understanding the political remedies doctrine to deny jurisdiction (or
require dismissal) outright, I propose that the political remedies doctrine be

89. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 125, 133 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“Federal judges cannot make . . . fundamentally political decisions” or “intrude into areas in
which they have little expertise,” but the “extraordinary remedial measures” taken in the wake
of Brown were appropriate given “the pace of desegregation and . . . the lack of a good-faith
effort on the part of school boards.”).
90. See infra Section II.A.
91. See infra Section II.B.
92. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
93. Harrison, supra note 3, at 505.
94. See infra Section II.B.
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understood to impose a substantive constraint on judicial power, requiring the court
to tailor the scope of its remedy to prevent undue interference with political actors.95
This is not a limit imposed by Article III. Rather, it is a border borne of conflict
between two branches exercising their respective constitutional prerogatives. Thus,
“political remedies” cases arise when a court possesses the constitutional power to
impose an equitable remedy of its choosing but defers or tempers its exercise of
power to allow a political actor to remedy the harm in the manner that actor sees fit.
Such a political remedies doctrine better explains equity’s place within our
constitutional system of separated powers and provides an explicit doctrinal vehicle
for navigating the kinds of constitutional conflicts that have unnecessarily confused
standing doctrine and the equitable remedies doctrine. The branches are not
“‘hermetically’ sealed” from one another,96 and the instrumentalist intuition behind
the Constitution’s checks and balances is that a “merging of functions” is (at times)
“both desirable and unavoidable.”97 By giving the departments of government
“partial agency . . . over . . . the acts of each other,”98 Madison recognized that “power
can be checked only if it is shared.”99
Rather than cutting off jurisdiction over whole categories of constitutional claims
due to the existence of (or potential for) overlapping exercises of power at the
conclusion of a case, the political remedies doctrine would require a substantive
separation-of-powers analysis about which actor should be exercising which function
at the remedial stage. In short, there may be instances where a court declines
authority not because it lacks jurisdiction over a case under Article III, but because
the court’s otherwise proper exercise of power faces external pressures from equally
proper (and conflicting) exercises of constitutional authority by other actors.100

95. See infra Section II.C.
96. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
97. Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies,
30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 687–88 (1978) [hereinafter Nagel, Separation of Powers ].
98. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 299 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., First Signet
Classic Printing 2003).
99. Nagel, Separation of Powers, supra note 97, at 682.
100. Compare infra Section II.A (discussing standing doctrine), with Section II.B
(discussing equitable remedies doctrine), and Section II.C (discussing the political remedies
doctrine).
The Supreme Court has occasionally indicated that the political question doctrine applies
only to the horizontal separation of powers between the President, Congress, and the judiciary.
See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 352 (1976) (“[T]he separation-of-powers principle, like the
political question doctrine, has no applicability to the federal judiciary’s relationship to the
States.”); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“[I]t is the relationship between the
judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal
judiciary’s relationship to the States, which gives rise to the ‘political question.’”).
The political remedies doctrine and political finality doctrine would take a more expansive
view because they are concerned with conflicts between federal judicial power and any
exercise of legislative or executive power by another actor properly vested with authority
under the Constitution. In other words, conflicting exercises might not always emanate from
Article I or Article II. State and local political actors may be vested with legislative or
executive power, and the doctrines herein would navigate those conflicts as well. See, e.g.,
Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 81 (1909) (accepting as conclusive the determination by the
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Based on the facts of the case, these external pressures might override the judicial
power only in part rather than in whole. In this way, the judiciary would “define its
own authority according to the same principles that limit the powers of the other
branches”101—with flexible and context-specific principles that take account of the
constitutional tensions and dynamics raised by the case at hand.102
A. Standing Doctrine—Redressability
(Absence of Article III Jurisdiction at the Pleadings Stage)
Article III of the Constitution vests the “judicial Power . . . in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may . . . ordain and establish.”103 This
judicial power “extend[s]” to a set of “Controversies” and “Cases, in Law and
Equity.”104 Thus, the Constitution explicitly locates equitable powers within the
judicial power,105 while simultaneously confining the judiciary’s exercise of that
power to “actual ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’”106
One of the doctrines that helps elucidate the meaning of this constitutional
limitation is standing.107 Standing doctrine traditionally focuses on the party before
a federal court, not the merits of the claim to be decided.108 To demonstrate that one
is a “proper party”109 with an actual case or controversy sufficient to invoke the
federal judicial power, plaintiffs must allege a cognizable injury that is “concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
redressable by a favorable ruling.”110
Injury in fact, traceability, and redressability reflect the “irreducible constitutional
minimum” required to open the courthouse doors and vest a federal court with
jurisdiction to hear a case.111 The separation of powers concern in such a standing
analysis is whether there is “too little” at stake to justify invoking the judicial power.

governor of Colorado that a state of insurrection existed in the state).
101. Nagel, Separation of Powers, supra note 97, at 664.
102. See id. at 680–81, 697–700 (reading from United States v. Nixon (Richard Nixon),
418 U.S. 683 (1974), a rule that when there are “two inconsistent claims for power” and each
appears proper, the Court should “deny the claim that represents the greater intrusion into . . .
the classically or textually defined function of the competing branch” while looking for “the
least restrictive means of reconciling the powers of both branches”).
103. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
104. Id. § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
105. While there was debate over the scope and meaning of this vesting at the time of
drafting and ratification, there is no doubt that this power was lodged within the judiciary. See
Morley, supra note 80, at 231.
106. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
107. Id.
108. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
109. See id. at 100–01; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and
Remedies—and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 644 (2006)
[hereinafter Fallon, Justiciability and Remedies] (noting that standing focuses on “the ‘who’
of [the] litigation”).
110. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010) (citing Horne v.
Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009)).
111. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
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By keeping judicial power tethered to real disputes, standing doctrine advances
Article III’s limitation upon the exercise of that power and ensures that legal
questions are resolved “in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.”112
At the pleadings stage, plaintiffs typically falter (if at all) on the injury-in-fact
requirement. However, plaintiffs have occasionally failed to adequately plead that
their injuries are “redressable” through judicial action. Here, structural concerns arise
when a “desired exercise of the court’s remedial powers” would have a “purely
speculative” impact on redressing the alleged injury.113 This limitation “prevents
judicial decrees that have no effect in the real world”114 and prevents the Court from
issuing advisory opinions.115
In recent decades, however, “redressability” has transformed into an all-purpose
separation of powers policing tool.
First, the Court has imported the limitations underlying its equitable remedies
doctrine116 and increasingly required plaintiffs to make rigorous factual showings at
the pleadings stage.117 Traditional equity limitations should be understood as a
reflection of the separation of powers in our modern system,118 but their structural
purpose differs from standing. Equitable remedies doctrine limits the scope of
authority to prevent overbroad orders at the remedies stage, not the existence of
jurisdiction at the pleadings stage.119
Specific factual evidence is required to justify equitable relief in a case over which
a court already has jurisdiction,120 but “general factual allegations” should suffice to
open the courthouse doors.121 An “indirect” theory of harm may make it more
difficult to adequately allege that prospective relief will redress a plaintiff’s injury,122
but courts should not require plaintiffs to “guarantee”123 or show a “substantial
likelihood”124 that their desired relief will completely “remove” the alleged harm,125

112. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
113. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42–43 (1976); see also Lujan, 504
U.S. at 568–71.
114. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 635, 646–47 (1985).
115. See Fallon, Justiciability and Remedies, supra note 109, at 652.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 155–161.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 161–172.
118. See Nagel, Separation of Powers, supra note 97, at 674.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 146–154.
120. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 567 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The scope
of permissible relief depends on the scope of any continuing violations, and therefore it was
essential for the three-judge court to make a reliable determination of the extent of any
violations as of the time its [remedial] order was issued.”).
121. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“At the pleading stage, general
factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice” to establish
“injury in fact.”).
122. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504–05 (1975).
123. See, e.g., Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86–87 (1981).
124. See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 45–46 (1976).
125. See, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 504–05.
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especially before the plaintiff has engaged in discovery and before the court has
learned the actual facts of the case.126 If a plaintiff has a legitimate grievance and
alleges that some nonspeculative relief appears likely, that should establish
redressability for standing.127
Second, the Court has raised wholly distinct separation of powers concerns in its
redressability calculus, asking not only whether a remedy would have a speculative
impact on the plaintiff but also whether the desired remedy would be appropriate for
a court to provide.128 In Allen v. Wright, for example, the Court began its standing
analysis by discussing the supposedly speculative nature of the desired remedy’s
impact129 but then quickly shifted directions, stating: “We could not recognize
respondents’ standing in this case without running afoul of [the] structural principle”
that “[t]he Constitution . . . assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial
Branch, the duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”130 According
to the Court, the requested remedy would “have the federal courts as virtually
continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”131 For
support, the Court threw in a citation to Gilligan v. Morgan—a political question
case.132
This rationale for declining judicial action is wholly different than the rationale at
the heart of the standing doctrine. Standing is concerned that there is “too little” at
stake to constitute a case or controversy; Allen is concerned that the court will be
asked to do “too much” to resolve that case or controversy.133 Rather than the threat
to the separation of powers coming from the danger of issuing an advisory opinion,134
the danger comes from the threat of federal courts usurping executive or legislative
functions.135

126. See Laura E. Little, It’s About Time: Unravelling Standing and Equitable Ripeness,
41 BUFF. L. REV. 933, 949 (1993) (observing how increasing the burden on plaintiffs at the
pleading stage “makes cautious reflection on the propriety of prospective relief impossible”
because the requirement of an “up-front decision” precludes the court and parties from
“explor[ing] the possible ramifications of the rejected injunction and [the possibility of]
tailor[ing] an appropriate decree”).
127. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“[I]t must be ‘likely,’ as
opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”
(quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43)); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 130 (1983)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[Q]uestions concerning remedy [should be] relevant to the
threshold issue of standing only in the limited sense that some relief must be possible.”
(emphasis added)).
128. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984).
129. See id. at 757–59.
130. Id. at 761 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
131. Id. at 760 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)).
132. See id. (citing Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
133. See Fallon, Justiciability and Remedies, supra note 109, at 649–52.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 111–115.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 130–131; see also Juliana v. United States, 947
F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2509, 2515
(2019), and holding that the federal courts lack the authority to redress climate change issues).
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This is the domain of the political question doctrine.136 As Justice Stevens
observed in his dissent, the Allen Court’s decision “confuses the standing doctrine
with the justiciability of the issues.”137 “If a plaintiff presents a nonjusticiable issue,
or seeks relief that a court may not award, then its complaint should be dismissed for
those reasons, and not because the plaintiff lacks a stake in obtaining that relief and
hence has no standing.”138 The specific reasons underlying the dismissal matter. “A
ruling that Article III requirements are not satisfied” when the real concern is
interference with legislative or executive functions “creates the risk that relief will
be denied even when the restraints of comity and federalism do not justify that
result.”139
Perhaps the Allen Court declined to invoke the political question doctrine because
the modern doctrine has become a weapon too powerful to use. The unusual way the
modern doctrine categorically strips whole clauses of judicial oversight should make
the Court wary. Yet, the solution to this problem is to rein in the political question
doctrine, not complicate or extend standing doctrine to fill the gap.140
Rather than asking standing to shoulder distinct and contradictory separation of
powers purposes, the Court should recognize the unique structural functions of the
equitable remedies doctrine and the political remedies doctrine. These doctrines
shape the scope of judicial authority at the remedies stage rather than denying the
existence of judicial authority at the pleadings stage.
B. The Equitable Remedies Doctrine
(Article III Constraints on the Scope of Judicial Authority at the Remedies Stage)
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has invoked the “law of equitable remedies”
in cases involving both private parties141 and public actors.142 In both circumstances,
the Court has appealed to the historical or traditional role of equity and of the
courts.143 “For example, in [eBay v. MercExchange]—a mere eight pages in the U.S.
Reports—the word tradition or a cognate appears fourteen times. That is the same
number of times tradition appears in the first song of Fiddler on the Roof.”144 What

136. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
137. Allen, 468 U.S. at 790 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 791; see also Fallon, Justiciability and Remedies, supra note 109, at 690
(suggesting that the Supreme Court should decide cases based on the doctrine—standing,
substantive, or remedial—that “would most perspicuously guide future analysis and produce
the best outcomes in lower court decisions”); Nichol, supra note 114, at 649 (observing that a
“hybrid standing analysis rather than the overt separation of powers scrutiny demanded by the
political question doctrine” allows the Court to avoid meaningful inquiries into—and
explanations about—the scope of its own power).
139. 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, § 3531.6.
140. See Nichol, supra note 114, at 657–58 (“If a case threatens the appropriate separation
of powers, it should be dismissed; but it should be dismissed under a doctrine that considers
such intrusion as its decisive factor—that is, the political question doctrine.”).
141. See Bray, supra note 88, at 1000 n.5 (collecting cases).
142. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 538 (2011); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,
88 (1995); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376–77 (1976).
143. See Bray, supra note 88, at 1000.
144. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,
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seems to be missing, however, is a “justification . . . for retaining the distinction
between legal and equitable remedies in contemporary American law.”145
Article III’s confining of the judicial (and equitable) power to resolving cases and
controversies provides this justification.146 Equitable discretion allows judges to craft
remedies that are tailored to the particulars of a case, but it is widely understood that
discretion has limits.147 Those limits prevent a court’s equitable powers from being
used as “a cloak for arbitrary judicial policymaking.”148 Whether in a dispute
between private parties or a dispute involving government actors, Article III prohibits
courts from exercising equitable powers beyond those reasonably necessary to
resolve and conclude the particular case. If the law provides a complete remedy,
federal courts have no authority to go further.149
The equitable remedies doctrine reflects the unsurprising fact that even a court
with jurisdiction over a case lacks the authority under Article III to do whatever it
wants.150 In correcting the consequences of a violation of law, a court’s remedial
orders may affect third parties who are party to a suit.151 This is not a new feature of
equitable power unique to modern “structural” injunctions—even traditional
equitable remedies were known to have some effect on third parties who had dealings
with the parties themselves.152 A court’s remedial orders must be grounded in a
“finding that legal remedies are not adequate”153 and must be “designed as nearly as
possible” to rectify the harm caused by the violation of law,154 however, to ensure
the court regulates as little legally indifferent conduct (public or private) as possible.
While standing doctrine determines whether there are sufficient factual
allegations to warrant vesting a court with jurisdiction over a case at the pleadings
stage, equitable remedies doctrine determines whether there are sufficient factual
findings to justify the scope of equitable power being exercised at the remedies stage.
Both limits derive from Article III’s case and controversy language, but their
justifications and implications are different. If a plaintiff lacks standing, the court
lacks jurisdiction entirely because there is no case or controversy to speak of. If a

390–94 (2006)).
145. Id. at 1050.
146. See Nagel, Separation of Powers, supra note 97, at 674 (noting that the “traditional
equity jurisdiction” cases reflect the concern that courts not invade the domain of the political
branches).
147. Bray, supra note 88, at 1041.
148. Id.
149. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977) (“[F]ederal-court
decrees must directly address and relate to the constitutional violation itself. Because of this
inherent limitation upon federal judicial authority, federal-court decrees exceed appropriate
limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the Constitution or does
not flow from such a violation . . . .”). That is not to say that the Court’s operationalization of
this concept is without problems.
150. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 161 (1971) (“The remedial powers of an
equity court must be adequate to the task, but they are not unlimited.”).
151. See Nagel, Separation of Powers, supra note 97, at 711, 715.
152. Id. at 711.
153. Bray, supra note 88, at 1038.
154. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88 (1995) (quoting Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280–81).
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plaintiff demands an overbroad remedy, the court only has authority to enter a
narrower remedy because no more is required to resolve the case or controversy.
The Supreme Court’s blurring of these concepts has unnecessarily complicated
standing doctrine, equitable remedies doctrine, and the political question doctrine.
First, the Court has been vague about the relationship between standing and the
equitable remedies doctrine. At times the Court seems to blend them, contending that
a court’s reasons for denying standing “shade into those determining whether the
complaint states a sound basis for equitable relief.”155 At other times, the Court seems
to set them side by side, contending that equitable remedy considerations provide
additional reasons for dismissal beyond standing—an advisory position that may
itself raise Article III concerns.156 At other times still, the Court seems to replace the
role of equitable remedies doctrine altogether by speaking about standing in
unconventional ways.157
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, for example, Justice Scalia noted that the
elements of standing “must be supported in the same way as any other matter on
which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of
evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.”158 Four years later,
Justice Scalia deployed this concept in Lewis v. Casey to limit a remedial order that
swept beyond the “actual injur[ies]” identified by the district court.159 There, he
observed that “[t]he actual-injury requirement would hardly serve [its] purpose” of
limiting judicial power if a plaintiff could “demonstrate[] harm from one particular
inadequacy” and then rely on that harm to seek a remedy addressing unrelated
“inadequacies.”160 Invoking an equitable remedies principle (and citing to equitable
remedies cases), Justice Scalia wrote, “The remedy must of course be limited to the
inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.” 161
As a technical matter, there is perhaps little difference between attributing this
principle to standing doctrine or equitable remedies doctrine. The benefit “of casting
th[is] conclusion in the language of standing [is] obscure,”162 but if no relief can be
accorded once the facts have been adduced at trial then it is not incorrect to conclude

155. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974).
156. Compare id. (“[E]ven if we were inclined to consider the complaint as presenting an
existing case or controversy, we would firmly disagree . . . that an adequate basis for equitable
relief . . . had been stated.”), with id. at 504 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“When we [hold that
a plaintiff lacks standing], it follows . . . that we are precluded from considering any other
issue presented for review. Thus, the Court’s additional discussion of the question whether a
case for equitable relief was stated amounts to an advisory opinion that we are powerless to
render.”).
157. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357–60 (1996); 13A W RIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 22, § 3531.6 (“A rather more confused nexus between standing and remedial decisions
was drawn in Lewis v. Casey.”).
158. 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
159. See 518 U.S. at 357–60.
160. Id. at 357.
161. Id. (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88, 89 (1995)); see also id. at 359–60
(citing to Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417 (1977); Califano v. Yamasaki,
442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)).
162. 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, § 3531.6.
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that the plaintiffs lack standing at the end of the day.163 As Justice Souter noted in
dissent, “it is true that the demise of [the plaintiffs’] claims could be expressed as a
failure of proof on the merits (and I would so express it), [and] it would be equally
correct to see these plaintiffs as losing on standing.”164
As a practical matter, however, “casting th[is] conclusion in the language of
standing”165 triggers a host of easily avoidable errors with profound consequences
for litigants. “Standing” is traditionally understood to refer to the sufficiency of
allegations on the pleadings, and failure under that doctrine is traditionally
understood to divest the court of jurisdiction over the case as a whole.166 Invoking
“standing” to describe situations where a proper plaintiff is before a court vested with
subject-matter jurisdiction but has only proven enough facts at trial to get a partial
remedy causes the word “standing” (and the word “jurisdiction”) to carry too many
meanings for careful and correct application in the mine-run of cases. It is more
natural (and less prone to mistake) to say that “the state of the evidence simply left
[the court] without an adequate basis for the exercise of its equitable discretion in
issuing [a broader] order . . . .”167
This is not just a matter of linguistic nicety. Litigants should be able to challenge
unlawful practices “and to obtain whatever relief a court may ultimately deem
appropriate” without having to wrangle on the pleadings about whether the
“particular forms of relief” requested will pan out exactly as initially envisioned.168
Conceiving of remedial options in standing terms has led courts to hold that “a
separate showing of standing for each form of relief” must be shown from the outset
of a case contrary to the “traditional conception of standing and of the remedial
powers of the federal courts.”169
The risk of conflating standing doctrine with the equitable remedies doctrine may
also tempt courts to collapse “jurisdictional and remedial concerns into a single
threshold enterprise.”170 This prevents courts from ever learning important details
about the alleged violation of law and the balance of interests involved—details that

163. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (“At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury
resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice;” whereas, “at the final stage, those facts
(if controverted) must be ‘supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.’” (quoting
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 n.31 (1979))); see 13A WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 22, § 3531.6 (“A determination even at the end of trial that the court is
not prepared to award any remedy that would benefit the plaintiff[s] may be expressed as a
conclusion that the plaintiff[s] lack[] standing.”).
164. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 395 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment).
165. 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, § 3531.6.
166. See id. § 3531.
167. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 397 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment).
168. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 114 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 122–23; see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006)
(“[O]ur standing cases confirm that a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he
seeks to press. We have insisted, for instance, that ‘a plaintiff must demonstrate standing
separately for each form of relief sought.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000))).
170. Little, supra note 126, at 947.
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might otherwise influence the court’s decision as to whether to provide relief.171
Framing remedial limitations in standing terms risks undermining the very values
and nuance that equitable principles were designed to foster.172
Thus, there is nothing to gain and much to lose by using the language of
“standing” and “jurisdiction” to describe tailored constraints on the contours of a
court’s equitable authority based on facts found at trial. These limitations are far
more accurately described and understood under the equitable remedies doctrine.
And that doctrine can be—and should be—rooted in Article III’s language confining
the judicial power to resolving concrete cases and controversies.
Second, the Court has lumped concerns about improper interference with federal,
state, and local political actors173 into the equitable remedies doctrine even though
this concern would more appropriately be managed by a “political remedies”
doctrine.174
Under the equitable remedies doctrine, Article III provides a centripetal constraint
upon exercises of a court’s equitable powers when those powers sweep more broadly
than required to resolve a case or controversy. This constraint upon the equitable
powers of the federal courts exists and applies whether the defendant is a government
actor or a private party.175
Under the political remedies doctrine, on the other hand, a court faces constraints
upon its equitable powers based on a conflict between two equally legitimate
exercises of constitutional authority. This arises when the breadth of the court’s
equitable power under Article III is justified by its factual findings, but remedying
the violation would require the court to exercise legislative or executive functions to
an unacceptable degree.176 In such cases, the court is limited not by Article III but by
other provisions in the Constitution that have drawn the court into conflict with
another actor properly vested with governmental authority.177
Admittedly, a court would likely use similar tools and tests when applying the
equitable remedies doctrine or the political remedies doctrine. Under both, a court
must tailor the temporal and substantive terms of its remedial orders to ensure that
the exercise of its equitable power is constitutionally valid.

171. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes
on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1984); see also 13A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 22, § 3531.6; Little, supra note 126, at 947, 948–49 (“With full
development of the facts motivating a dispute, a federal court may readily grant relief that the
court was actually inclined to deny at the inception of the suit.”).
172. See Little, supra note 126, at 951–52.
173. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88 (1995) (quoting Milliken II, 433 U.S.
267, 280–81 (1977)); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361 (1996).
174. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349 (“It is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in
individual or class actions, who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not
the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in
such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution.”).
175. See Bray, supra note 88, at 1038 (noting that equitable remedies are considered
“exceptional” by the Court in private party suits and noting that “[a]ny departure from the
norm [of legal remedies] demands justification . . . even if it is easily made”).
176. See infra Section II.C.
177. See infra Section II.C.
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Given the distinct source and force of each doctrine, however, these tools and tests
might be employed with differing degrees of rigor and deference. In a case involving
private actors, the factual findings required to justify equitable action may be
minimal and the discretion available to the court in structuring its remedy may be
wide.178 In a case involving public authorities, the factual findings required may be
greater and the discretion available to the court may be narrower.179 That is because
the court’s duty under the political remedies doctrine is to balance two demands:
ensuring the violation is remedied and giving the political actor discretion in the
means of compliance. If a recalcitrant actor fails to timely comply in good faith,
stronger and more specific remedial measures may be warranted to strike the right
balance.180
C. The Political Remedies Doctrine
(Conflicting Constitutional Authority at the Remedies Stage)
By now it may be clear that the Supreme Court has been applying a version of the
“political remedies doctrine” for more than half a century under various names and
labels.181 Whether expressed through unconventional (or unprincipled) applications
of standing doctrine,182 through rigorous applications of the equitable remedies
doctrine,183 or through the political question doctrine,184 the Court reins in lower
courts’ equitable powers when they come into tension with exercises of legislative
or executive authority. This occurs even when Article III confers judicial authority
to rectify a constitutional wrong under traditional standing or equitable remedy rules.

178. See Bray, supra note 88, at 1038 (noting that district courts “must make an explicit
finding that legal remedies are not adequate,” but also that “the Court has not made it difficult
to make that finding”) (emphasis in original).
179. See infra text accompanying notes 187–192.
180. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 125 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
181. See, e.g., Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 299, 300–01 (1955) (“School authorities have the
primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have
to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of
the governing constitutional principles.”); see also infra text accompanying notes 193–219
(discussing Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 14 (1973), and Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493,
567 (2011)).
182. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984) (denying standing in part because,
“[c]arried to its logical end, [plaintiffs’] approach would have the federal courts as virtually
continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action” (quoting Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972))); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974) (denying
standing in part because plaintiffs’ requested relief “seems to us nothing less than an ongoing
federal audit of state criminal proceedings”).
183. See, e.g., Plata, 563 U.S. at 555 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (invoking Baker-like factors
in an equitable remedies analysis, including the commitment of functions to political actors
and the incompetence of judges in setting policy preferences).
184. See Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 11–12; see also Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political
Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 618 n.59 (1976) (“Among the considerations in
Justice Brennan’s list in Baker v. Carr, several seem more persuasive as reasons to deny an
equitable remedy, or a particular equitable remedy, than to support a finding of
nonjusticiability . . . .” (citation omitted)).
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By recognizing that the Constitution confers overlapping powers and that liberty
and justice are secured through their tension, the Court can evaluate separation of
powers questions more honestly. The Court need not cut off jurisdiction entirely to
acknowledge that a conflict between constitutional demands may affect the breadth
and application of its normal equitable authority185 or—in rare cases—render judicial
relief unavailable.186
When a governmental actor violates the Constitution and equitable relief is
necessary, the political remedies doctrine should require courts to find “the least
restrictive means of reconciling the powers of both branches.”187 As Professor Robert
Nagel has argued, the more generalized assertion should yield to the more specific
need, but “the losing claim [should] be subordinated only to the minimum extent
necessary to resolve the conflict between the branches.”188 Typically, this means a
court should tailor the temporal and/or substantive scope of its remedy, leaving the
political actor discretion to choose its preferred means of compliance with the
constitutional demands articulated by the court.189 However, in the rare case where
“the relationship between political and judicial power means that no relief can be
granted,” the claim may be dismissed as nonjusticiable.190 Rather than operating as
a limitation on subject-matter jurisdiction under Article III, however, the doctrine
would require dismissal based on a substantive separation of powers interpretation
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).191
To evaluate whether a remedy involves exercising legislative or executive
functions, the court might consider—among other interpretive clues—the Baker
factors. For example, if (1) the function is textually committed to a political actor,
(2) the standards governing the creation of the remedy are difficult to discern, (3)
crafting the remedy would require “an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion,” and/or (4) the remedy might reflect a lack of due
respect,192 then the court’s exercise of remedial power may well be overlapping with
executive or legislative power.
Gilligan v. Morgan shows how the political remedies doctrine could lead to the
outright dismissal of a claim.193 In May 1970, the Ohio National Guard was called
out to Kent State University by the Governor of Ohio in response to protests. 194 In
the chaos that followed, guardsmen killed four students and wounded nine others.
After the tragedy, students at Kent State sought injunctive relief to prevent such an
event from occurring again.195 Although the Ohio National Guard adopted new use-

185. See infra text accompanying notes 208–220.
186. See infra text accompanying notes 193–207.
187. Nagel, Separation of Powers, supra note 97, at 698.
188. Id. at 699–700.
189. See id. at 709 (“[T]he plausibility that the injunctive language is necessary to fulfill
the courts’ constitutional function decreases as the gap between the generality of the
constitutional language and the specificity of the injunctive language increases.”).
190. Harrison, supra note 3, at 496.
191. Id. at 487–89; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
192. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
193. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
194. Id. at 3.
195. Id. at 3–4.
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of-force rules and initiated new training related to civil-disorder control after the
event, the Supreme Court found the action was not moot because the plaintiffs had
requested additional injunctive and supervisory relief above and beyond the changes
implemented by the National Guard.196 This additional relief sought by the plaintiffs
envisioned the district court “assum[ing] continuing regulatory jurisdiction over the
activities of the Ohio National Guard” and “establish[ing] standards for [its] training,
kind of weapons and scope[,] and kind of orders to control [its] actions.” 197
The Supreme Court held that no justiciable controversy was presented “in this
case.”198 Relying on the traditional Baker factors, the Court invoked “the explicit
command of Art. I, § 8, cl. 16, [of the Constitution], which vests in Congress the
power: ‘[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia.’”199 The
relief sought “would therefore embrace critical areas of responsibility vested by the
Constitution” in the political branches.200 The Court also observed that it would be
“difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have
less competence” and that “[t]he complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to
the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are . . .
appropriately vested in branches of the government which are periodically subject to
electoral accountability.”201
Yet the Court also noted its decision was a narrow one, focused on the specific
remedy sought in the specific case at hand. Chief Justice Burger wrote that the Court
was “neither hold[ing] nor imply[ing] that the conduct of the National Guard is
always beyond judicial review or that there may not be accountability in a judicial
forum for violations of law or for specific unlawful conduct by military personnel,
whether by way of damages or injunctive relief.”202 The Court explicitly left open
the door for future plaintiffs to seek “a restraining order against some specified and
imminently threatened unlawful [military] action.”203
Gilligan therefore hardly stands for the proposition that military decisions are
unamenable to judicial standards or subject only to “self-monitoring” by the political
branches. As Professor Harrison observes, the political remedies doctrine only limits
the “judicial displacement of discretion, not the application of legal standards to
military decisions.”204 While “[e]xtensive judicial control of military policy” is not
permitted, “military decisions [are] still subject to the law.”205
In Gilligan, the Court did not face an intransigent political actor, defiantly
condoning unconstitutional behavior or evading good-faith compliance. The

196. Id. at 4–5.
197. Id. at 5–6.
198. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 6 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16).
200. Id. at 7.
201. Id. at 10.
202. Id. at 11–12 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Court made good on its
promise regarding damages in Scheuer v. Rhodes, another case arising from the Kent State
massacre in which the Court held that the plaintiffs’ claims were not barred by sovereign
immunity. 416 U.S. 232, 238–49 (1974).
203. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 5.
204. Harrison, supra note 3, at 483.
205. Id.
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National Guard had already corrected the deficiencies it considered to be the cause
of the constitutional violations: its training and use-of-force rules.206 Although the
case technically was not moot because the plaintiffs requested additional relief, that
additional relief involved little more than a displacement of the political actor’s
proper authority, constitutional role, and legally indifferent sphere of discretion.207
Thus, the political remedies doctrine required dismissal of the claim as
nonjusticiable.
Brown v. Plata shows how the political remedies doctrine can be applied without
dismissing a claim outright as nonjusticiable.208 Although Plata is not traditionally
understood as a “political question” case, it should be.209 In Plata, the Supreme Court
reviewed a remedial order entered to address prison-crowding levels causing Eighth
Amendment violations.210 The majority held that courts must be sensitive to the
state’s “interest in punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation” and must exhibit
deference to “experienced and expert prison administrators faced with the difficult
and dangerous task of housing large numbers of convicted criminals.”211
Nevertheless, “[c]ourts may not allow constitutional violations to continue simply
because a remedy would involve intrusion into the realm of prison administration.”212
The Court struck this balance by emphasizing that courts should give politically
accountable actors wide latitude to cure constitutional defects themselves, restricting
that latitude only as necessary to ensure timely, good-faith compliance.213 As a
general legal principle, this position received unanimous support.214 Justice Alito and

206. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 4–5.
207. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (“Remedial
judicial authority does not put judges automatically in the shoes of school authorities whose
powers are plenary. Judicial authority enters only when local authority defaults.”).
208. 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
209. See Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the
Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 651 (1989) [hereinafter Nagel, Political
Law, Legalistic Politics] (discussing the political question debate between Wechsler and
Bickel, observing that “[t]he analogous issue today arises at the remedial stage of a lawsuit,”
and providing examples of “political” considerations entering courts’ remedial calculus in
school desegregation and prison standards cases); Seidman, supra note 39, at 468–69 (“[T]he
law of constitutional remedy lies outside the bounds of constitutionalism” because “when the
Court turned to remedy [in Brown II], the issues became practical and political rather than
principled and constitutional.”).
210. 563 U.S. at 499–500.
211. Id. at 511.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 500–02, 510, 511. In Plata, the Court’s review of the remedial measures was
influenced by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995—a statutory regime enacted by
Congress to govern the courts’ remedial processes in such cases. See id. at 500, 511–13.
Nonetheless, the Court pointed out that the Act “should not be interpreted to place undue
restrictions on the authority of federal courts to fashion practical remedies when confronted
with complex and intractable constitutional violations” and that “[a] reading of the [Act] that
would render population limits unavailable in practice would raise serious constitutional
concerns.” Id. at 526.
214. See id. at 565 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he Constitution does not give
federal judges the authority to run state penal systems” and that “States are generally free to
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Chief Justice Roberts dissented on narrow grounds, arguing that “an adequate but
less drastic remedial plan could have been crafted.”215 Justices Scalia and Thomas
critiqued the breadth of modern structural injunctions (including the one at issue),216
but acknowledged that structural equitable relief may be available in limited
circumstances.217
While Plata is ostensibly not a political question case, Justice Scalia’s dissent
provides a classic political question analysis. Justice Scalia argues that structural
injunctions “require judges to play a role essentially indistinguishable from the role
ordinarily played by executive officials” and “force judges to engage in a form of
factfinding-as-policymaking that is outside the traditional judicial role.”218
According to Justice Scalia, this necessitates “the sort of predictive judgment that
our system of government allocates to other government officials” and invites
“judges to indulge policy preferences” that they are “incompetent” to make.219
This functional analysis of respective constitutional roles aligns, unsurprisingly,
with some of the nontextual Baker factors commonly invoked in domestic political
question cases: a lack of judicially manageable standards, the necessity of making
policy decisions not typically made by judges, and the difficulty of providing an
independent resolution while respecting the decisions of political officials.220
When a court turns to the remedies stage of a case, “the issues [become] practical
and political rather than principled and constitutional.”221 The degree of
enforcement—the strictness and structure of any particular remedy—will necessarily
involve value-laden judgments.222 But that does not make their resolution by a
judicial actor exceptional or constitutionally inappropriate—these functional
overlaps between the branches necessarily exist on a spectrum.223 Sometimes a
political actor’s otherwise legitimate executive or legislative authority will conflict
with a federal court’s legitimate equitable authority to remedy a violation of rights.
Political authorities may comply with constitutional commands in a manner
different than envisioned by the court.224 It is the political departments’ prerogative

make these decisions as they choose,” but recognizing that “[t]he Eighth Amendment imposes
an important—but limited—restraint on state authority in this field” and that “[f]ederal courts
have the responsibility to ensure that this constitutional standard is met”); see also id. at 563–
64 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that a court may order extremely limited structural relief to
alter specific conditions that deprive each member of a class of their Eighth Amendment rights,
or may order a prisoner’s release only if “it determines that the prisoner is suffering from a
violation of his constitutional rights, and that his release, and no other relief, will remedy that
violation”).
215. Id. at 574 (Alito, J., dissenting).
216. See id. at 554–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. See id. at 563–64.
218. Id. at 555.
219. Id. at 557–58.
220. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
221. Seidman, supra note 39, at 468.
222. See id. at 468–69.
223. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977).
224. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1787 (1991) (“[A] complaint about [the
substitution of one remedy for another that is preferred by the claimant] can rarely be of
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to use discretion in exercising their powers; it is the judicial department’s duty to
ensure that the exercise of those powers does not violate the Constitution. On rare
occasions, such as Gilligan, the conflict may require a court to declare a claim
nonjusticiable. But this is usually the exception to the rule, when good-faith
compliance has cured all cause for constitutional concern.225
The political remedies doctrine creates space for interbranch dialogue about
political preferences, the relative institutional competencies of the institutions
involved, and the constitutional sufficiency of the solutions envisioned, with courts
empowered to modulate the scope of their remedial involvement in a way tailored to
the specific dynamics and issues raised in the case. Rather than denying the existence
or significance of practical factors in shaping equitable remedies, the doctrine would
make their role explicit and allow courts to defer where appropriate.
***
With respect to redistricting, the political remedies doctrine provides a conceptual
framework for understanding a host of principles that the Supreme Court has
imposed on district courts overseeing redistricting remedies.226 We are well beyond
the day when implementing a remedial plan simpliciter could be considered an
unconstitutional exercise of equitable power under the political question doctrine,227
but the political remedies doctrine still regulates judicial involvement in this sensitive

constitutional dimension.” (alteration in original) (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 1362, 1366 (1953))); Seidman, supra note 39, at 469 (“The decision to impose one
remedy rather than another is . . . political . . . .”).
225. The political remedies doctrine would not, for example, sanction a complete failure
to remedy an identified constitutional harm based on the court supposedly lacking authority
over an entire category of constitutional claims. There is a difference between deferring to a
political actor’s good-faith remedy (as in Gilligan) and categorically foreclosing a judicial
remedy in response to an actor’s bad faith. The latter conception of the doctrine has a
particularly odious history stretching back to the Court’s 1903 decision in Giles v. Harris. 189
U.S. 475 (1903). In Giles, the Court held that it could not provide “a remedy for political
wrongs” and stood idly by in the face of a sweeping disenfranchisement scheme targeting
black voters. See id. at 486. In a shocking declaration of its own perceived impotence, the
Court stated that “[u]nless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that State by officers of
the court, it seems to us that all that the plaintiff could get from equity would be an empty
form.” Id. at 488. Once the Court had effectively blessed these schemes with its categorical
abdication, they spread to other states and “virtual[ly] eliminat[ed] black citizens from political
participation in the South” for well over half-a-century. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, AntiDemocracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 297, 313 (2000). In Louisiana, for
example, the number of black voters on the registration rolls dropped from 130,334 to 730
between 1896 and 1910. Id. at 303.
226. See generally G. Michael Parsons, Justice Denied: Equity, Elections, and Remedial
Redistricting Rules, 19 J.L. SOC’Y 229 (2019) [hereinafter Parsons, Justice Denied].
227. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552–53 (1946) (plurality opinion) (“Of course
no court can affirmatively re-map [congressional] districts so as to bring them more in
conformity with the standards of fairness for a representative system. At best we could only
declare the existing electoral system invalid.”).
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area so judges do not impose maps based on their own views of what a “fair” system
looks like.
A federal court usually must afford legislators an opportunity to enact a
replacement plan when a constitutional violation is found.228 And, even if the
legislature fails to comply and the court must draw a replacement map, the court must
limit its changes to remedying the constitutional violation,229 guided by whatever
legitimate policy preferences underlie the challenged map.230 All of these principles
should be understood as instantiations of the political remedies doctrine.
The political remedies doctrine recognizes that federal courts have the power to
remedy identifiable violations of the Constitution but are “ill suited” to undertake (in
the first instance) the kind of freeform districting that relies upon an exercise of
“political judgment.”231 When a wholesale overhaul of a redistricting plan is
unnecessary to correct a constitutional harm but the courts charge forward anyway,
they “go beyond requiring compliance with the law and require or forbid some
conduct that is itself legally indifferent.”232
There is, to be sure, a danger in overdoctrinalizing the exercise of equitable
power.233 Courts must retain the ability to “mould each decree to the necessities of
the particular case”234 to ensure bad faith is not rewarded. Clear rules can be
gamed,235 and excessive deference to political remedies might incentivize
unconstitutional conduct by lowering the “cost” of constitutional violations.236
Whatever the proper balance, however, the political remedies doctrine makes one
thing clear: curing political-gerrymandering violations would require no more or less
judicial intrusion than any other redistricting claim. Some cases (such as racial
gerrymandering cases) may require revising only a handful of district boundaries,
whereas other cases (such as one-person, one-vote cases) may implicate so many
districts that a new map is necessary.237 Either way, the remedy would remain
“limited to the inadequacy that produced [the] injury in fact”238 and could be
entrusted to the legislature in the first instance.

228. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978).
229. Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 43 (1982).
230. Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 393 (2012) (quoting Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74,
79 (1997)).
231. See id.
232. Harrison, supra note 3, at 505.
233. See generally Parsons, Justice Denied, supra note 226.
234. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (quoting Hecht
Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)).
235. See generally Parsons, Justice Denied, supra note 226.
236. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation
of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 419 (2000).
237. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930 (2018).
238. See id. (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996)).
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III. JUDICIAL POWER AND POLITICAL ADJUDICATION
Political questions most commonly arise when the federal courts are called to
decide cases that involve issues that appear to be entrusted to political actors.239 Here,
too, the Court intermingles the purposes and contours of standing doctrine and the
political question doctrine, muddling both in the process.240 By pulling them apart, a
more coherent pair of structural principles could result.
As discussed above, standing doctrine deprives a federal court of jurisdiction if
the question involved does not present a case or controversy.241 This ensures that the
judicial power is only exercised to resolve genuine disputes.242 If a case presents a
cognizable injury that is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling,” then the
court has the constitutional authority to decide the case and the standing inquiry is at
an end.243
Another variant of the political question doctrine—the “political finality”
doctrine244—reflects a narrower proposition: that a court should treat certain factual
determinations (or decisions regarding mixed questions of fact and law) made by the
political branches as conclusive in the course of resolving a case before it.245 In other
words, the courts may defer to the political branches to decide particular issues within
a case, but then go on to adjudicate the case.
As Professor Tara Leigh Grove has shown, this approach reflects the “traditional
political question doctrine” that was consistently applied by courts during the
nineteenth century in political question cases.246 These cases did not treat
justiciability as a matter of Article III jurisdiction247 and did not dismiss
constitutional claims (let alone whole categories of cases) as nonjusticiable.248
According to Grove, these historical “political questions” were not constitutional
questions at all.249 Instead, they were (what lawyers then viewed
as) factual determinations made by the political branches that courts treated as
conclusive in the course of deciding cases.250

239. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849); Walter Nixon, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
240. See infra Sections III.A, III.B.
241. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006) (quoting 2 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)).
242. See supra Section II.A.
243. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010).
244. Professor Harrison refers to this concept as “non-judicial finality,” see Harrison, supra
note 3, at 504, and Professor Grove refers to it as the “traditional political question doctrine,”
see Grove, supra note 3, at 1911. I will refer to the concept as the “political finality doctrine”
throughout.
245. See Grove, supra note 3, at 1911, 1918; Harrison, supra note 3, at 461–68.
246. Grove, supra note 3, at 1911–15.
247. Id. at 1911.
248. Id. at 1912.
249. Id. at 1915–24.
250. Id. The courts’ treatment of such political questions actually was “categorical” in one
sense—the political determination of the issue was considered binding on all federal and state
courts. See id. at 1939, 1945–48, 1967–69. This treatment does not track the categorical
concept deployed today under the modern political question doctrine (i.e., placing whole
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Distinguishing how standing doctrine and the political finality doctrine intersect
with federal courts’ decisional authority over cases and within cases would allow
federal courts to engage with political actors in a more nuanced and principled
manner.
A. Standing Doctrine—Injury in Fact
(Absence of Article III Jurisdiction Over a Case)
Article III of the Constitution vests the “judicial Power” in the federal courts but
limits that judicial power to resolving “Cases” and “Controversies.”251 As the
Supreme Court has observed, the judicial power “cannot be defined, and indeed has
no substance, without reference to the necessity ‘to adjudge the legal rights of
litigants in actual controversies.’”252
Standing doctrine is chiefly concerned with ensuring that the party before the
court presents a genuine case or controversy and preventing the federal courts from
resolving abstract questions of law.253 The elements of standing are designed to serve
this purpose and “assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be
resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual
context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial
action.”254
As malleable and indeterminate as standing may be,255 its doctrinal framework is
relatively stable, its purposes are fairly clear, and its jurisdictional effect is tied to a
distinct constitutional concept, that of requiring a case or controversy.256 The modern
political question doctrine, on the other hand, parrots standing doctrine in ways that
add nothing to the constitutional arsenal and undermines standing doctrine in ways
that cannot be justified by Article III. Nowhere is this clearer than in the Supreme
Court’s most prominent political-gerrymandering cases: Vieth v. Jubelirer,257 Gill v.
Whitford,258 and Rucho v. Common Cause.259
In Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Supreme Court faced a partisan-gerrymandering
challenge to Pennsylvania’s congressional redistricting plan.260 Across a plurality
opinion, a concurring opinion, and three separate dissents, all of the Justices assumed
that partisan gerrymandering could violate the Constitution,261 and a majority

categories of constitutional claims or cases beyond judicial cognizance).
251. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
252. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454
U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (quoting Liverpool, N.Y.C. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration,
113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)).
253. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 223 (1974).
254. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
255. See, e.g., Fallon, Justiciability and Remedies, supra note 109, at 634–35, 634–35
nn.1–2 (collecting commentary on how standing decisions are influenced by—or are
functionally equivalent to—judgments about the merits).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 103–112, 251–254.
257. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
258. 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
259. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
260. 541 U.S. at 271 (plurality opinion).
261. See id. at 293 (plurality opinion); id. at 316–17 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 326
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assumed that the difficulty of fashioning a standard risked rendering such claims
“nonjusticiable” and beyond judicial review.262
According to the plurality, the second Baker factor—the existence of a judicially
discoverable and manageable standard—posed the central question of the case.263 If
the Court deemed it “impossible” to articulate a judicially manageable standard, then
Article III would deny judges “the power—and duty—to control political
gerrymandering.”264 This holding would categorically “foreclose all possibility of
judicial relief” in political-gerrymandering cases across the board,265 and leave
legislators forevermore to be the sole judges of their own constitutional violations.
In assuming this framing of the debate, most of the Justices based their analyses
on a modern view of the political question doctrine without ever stopping to ask
whether its categorical approach to jurisdiction setting was reconcilable with the very
separation of powers principles it was supposed to protect. After all, Vieth did not
interpret any constitutional provision to foreclose the judicial power to adjudicate
partisan-gerrymandering claims;266 rather, the plurality purported to foreclose an
entire category of future, hypothetical claims from judicial review based on facts,
legal theories, and arguments not before it.267
This is precisely the kind of sweeping and abstract constitutional pontification
that standing doctrine is designed to prevent.268 Rather than asking a narrow,
substantive question posed in a discrete case (whether the Constitution assigns the
resolution of an issue before the Court in the case at hand to a coordinate branch),
the modern doctrine asks a broad, abstract question untethered to any specific case
(whether it is theoretically “impossible” to craft a standard to identify political
gerrymandering violations).
The Vieth plurality starts out uncontroversially enough, noting that “judicial
action must be governed by standard”269 and analyzing each test proposed, raising
tailored critiques for each.270 So far, this is routine judicial fare. From here, however,
the Court takes a large and illogical leap, theorizing that its objections reveal

(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 346–53 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 360–62 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
262. Id. at 281 (plurality opinion); id. at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
263. Id. at 278 (“The second [factor] is at issue here . . . .”). It is worth noting that although
Justice Scalia discussed Congress’s power under Article I to regulate congressional
redistricting, see id. at 274–77, he did not argue that this satisfied Baker’s first factor. Instead,
he focused specifically on Baker’s second factor. See id. at 278; see also Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at
2498 (observing that the Vieth plurality “would have held that the plaintiffs’ claims were
nonjusticiable because there was no ‘judicially discernible and manageable standard’ for
deciding them”). The likely reasons for this focus on manageability are discussed below. See
infra text accompanying notes 381–397.
264. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277–78.
265. Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
266. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
267. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281–306 (setting out reasons why partisan gerrymandering is not
amenable to judicially manageable standards).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 253–254.
269. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (emphasis in original) (“[L]aw pronounced by the courts must
be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.”).
270. See id. at 281–305.
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political-gerrymandering claims to be intrinsically incapable of resolution by
judicially manageable standards.271
As Justice Kennedy responds in his concurrence, “[r]elying on the distinction
between a claim having or not having a workable standard . . . hinges entirely on
proof that no standard could exist.”272 This is a conclusion the plurality had not and
could not demonstrate. To hold it was “impossible to assess the effects of partisan
gerrymandering, to fashion a standard for evaluating a violation, and finally to craft
a remedy”273 required the Court to reach beyond the confines of Article III and opine
about factual circumstances and legal arguments not before it.274
In attempting to respond to Justice Kennedy’s argument, Justice Scalia raises
three examples that unintentionally reveal the modern doctrine’s fundamental flaw:
rather than interpreting the Constitution to decide if judicial action itself would be
unlawful, the doctrine inverts the inquiry. 275 The Court instead asks if judicial action
seems inappropriate as a matter of prudence to determine whether it will interpret the
Constitution at all.276
First, Justice Scalia invokes the Justices’ July 18, 1793, letter to President
Washington declining to render legal advice on the meaning of treaties the United
States was party to.277 Justice Scalia notes that the Justices responded in a
“categorical” manner, “saying that the giving of advisory opinions—not just
advisory opinions on particular questions but all advisory opinions . . .—was beyond
their power.”278
But nothing in the Justices’ letter suggests they declined Washington’s invitation
because they thought it “impossible” to come up with a standard for determining
when advisory opinions might be appropriate or because they thought it might reflect
poorly on the Court.279 As Justice Scalia himself recognizes in Vieth, the Justices

271. See id. at 281, 305–06.
272. Id. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
273. Id. at 287 (plurality opinion).
274. See id. (opining without record evidence about the discernibility of political
affiliation, stating that “[w]e dare say (and hope) that the political party which puts forward
an utterly incompetent candidate will lose even in its registration stronghold,” and claiming
that “[t]hese facts make it impossible to assess the effects of partisan gerrymandering, to
fashion a standard for evaluating a violation, and finally to craft a remedy”).
275. See id. at 302–03.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 32–64.
277. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 302.
278. Id.
279. See generally Letter from Chief-Justice Jay and Associate Justices to President
Washington (July 20, 1793), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY
1782-1793, at 487–88 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1891).
Nor can it be said to be inherently impossible to craft a standard for determining when—
and under what conditions—an advisory opinion might be permissible or appropriate. The
Maine Constitution, for example, states: “The Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court shall be
obliged to give their opinion upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions,
when required by the Governor, Senate or House of Representatives.” ME. CONST. art. VI, §
3. Accordingly, the Justices of Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court have developed “guideposts”
to ascertain when a “solemn occasion” exists and to “assure that [they] do not overstep [their]
bounds.” See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 162 A.3d 188, 201–04 (Me. 2017). If the Justices
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who wrote the letter to Washington interpreted the Constitution to forbid them from
offering advisory opinions.280 And, federal courts across the country continue to
engage in this interpretive exercise on a case-by-case basis whenever they apply
standing doctrine. As the Justices wrote, “[t]he lines of separation drawn by the
Constitution between the three departments of the government” and “the power given
by the Constitution to the President, of calling on the heads of departments for
opinions” meant that the Court was forbidden from offering extrajudicial legal
guidance.281 The Justices determined this was so despite the fact that such a decision
“may cause embarrassment to your administration.”282
Second, Justice Scalia cites Gilligan v. Morgan283 for the proposition that the
Court “held [a] suit nonjusticiable . . . because, inter alia, ‘it is difficult to conceive
of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence.’”284
According to Justice Scalia, the Court “did not adopt the more ‘cautious’ course of
letting the lower courts try their hand at regulating the military before we declared it
impossible.”285
But, again, the Gilligan Court did not declare constitutional violations by the
National Guard categorically unamenable to equitable remedy, let alone on the sole
basis that doing so was “impossible.”286 The Gilligan Court held that overseeing the
normal operations of the military is a task committed to the political branches, that
courts may not displace that role, and that no justiciable controversy was presented
in that specific case.287 The Court’s “competence” concerns provided additional
functional reasons to validate its largely textual interpretation of the Constitution’s
allocation of roles. And, contrary to Justice Scalia’s characterization,288 the Gilligan
Court explicitly qualified the reach of its holding, stating that a court could enjoin
the military from “specified and imminently threatened unlawful action” were such
a case to arise.289
Third, Justice Scalia points to Walter Nixon v. United States290 for the proposition
that the Court can never review “a claim that the Senate ha[s] employed certain
impermissible procedures in trying an impeachment.”291 As an initial matter, this
objection has the same flaw as the first: the Court did not hold that impeachment

had interpreted cases or controversies to include disputes over important advisory questions,
a standard would have surely emerged and developed over time, just as standing doctrine has
developed over time.
280. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 302.
281. Letter from Chief-Justice Jay and Associate Justices to President Washington (Aug.
8, 1793), in 3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, supra note 279, at 488.
282. Id. at 489.
283. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
284. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 303 (quoting Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10).
285. Id. at 303.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 202–205.
287. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 11–12.
288. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 302 (“When it has come to determining what areas fall beyond our
Article III authority to adjudicate, this Court’s practice, from the earliest days of the Republic
to the present, has been more reminiscent of Hannibal than of Hamlet.”).
289. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 5.
290. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
291. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 303.
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procedures were unamenable to judicial review solely on the basis that such review
would be “unmanageable.”292 The Nixon Court examined the text, structure, and
history of the Constitution and relied heavily upon its unusually explicit assignment
of a traditionally judicial function to a political actor: the “Power to try all
Impeachments.”293
More importantly, scholars rightfully critiqued the Nixon decision for sweeping
far broader than necessary to resolve the case.294 The Court could have found the
issue outside its constitutional authority based on a deferential substantive
interpretation in the case at hand and did not need to deploy a categorical
jurisdictional exclusion.295 Such an approach would have had a similar result without
tacitly precommitting the Court to absurd results.296
Regardless, none of the examples cited by Justice Scalia were based solely upon
speculation that developing judicially manageable standards would be “impossible.”
In each case the Court looked to the meaning of the Constitution to guide its decision,
and in each case the most helpful guide to that meaning was the text itself.297
Making an abstract judgment about the “impossibility” of standards, on the other
hand, necessarily purports to reach cases, circumstances, facts, and arguments
beyond those presented by the case before the Court,298 contrary to the limits imposed
on judicial power by Article III.299

292. The Nixon majority did conclude “that the use of the word ‘try’ in the first sentence
of the Impeachment Trial Clause lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable
standard of review,” 506 U.S. at 230, but the Court did not rest its holding on this argument
alone, see id. at 228–38. Justice White rightfully takes the majority to task for this: “One might
think that if any class of concepts would fall within the definitional abilities of the Judiciary,
it would be that class having to do with procedural justice.” Id. at 248 (White, J., concurring).
293. See id. at 229–38 (interpreting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6).
294. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights: The
Other Nixon v. United States, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 125 (1993).
295. See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 39, at 454–55 (noting that the Court could have decided
on the merits to allow Congress to adopt any interpretation of the word “try” so long as that
interpretation was rational).
296. See Walter Nixon, 506 U.S. at 246 (White, J., concurring) (noting that even the
Government itself conceded that the Senate would fail to “try” an impeachment if it “adopt[ed]
the practice of automatically entering a judgment of conviction whenever articles of
impeachment were delivered from the House”); id. at 252–54 (Souter, J., concurring) (“I agree
with the Court that this case presents a nonjusticiable political question. . . . One can,
nevertheless, envision different and unusual circumstances that might justify a more searching
review of impeachment proceedings. If the Senate were to act in a manner seriously
threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a coin toss, . . . judicial interference
might well by appropriate.”).
297. See supra text accompanying notes 277–293.
298. See Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Householder, 373 F. Supp. 3d 978, 1080 (S.D.
Ohio 2019), vacated and remanded, 140 S. Ct. 101 (2019) (“[I]f courts were to rely solely on
the lack of a judicially manageable standard to conclude that an issue qualifies as a political
question, then courts would be opining on the manageability of standards not involved in the
case at hand. That would be imprudent because a court can dispose of only the matters in a
case currently before it . . . .”).
299. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454
U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
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If plaintiffs fail to provide an adequate way for the Court to identify a
particularized and concrete constitutional injury, the course “legally available” to the
Court is to “adjudicate only what is in the papers before [it]”300 and to hold that the
plaintiffs lack Article III standing.301
To its credit, this is precisely what the Court did in Gill v. Whitford.302 In Gill, the
Supreme Court reviewed a statewide challenge to Wisconsin’s state legislative
plan.303 The plaintiffs alleged that the plan was so egregiously skewed to favor
Republicans that it violated the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.304 To gauge this asymmetry, the plaintiffs provided a metric—the
efficiency gap—that would allow the Court to measure the adverse impact that the
plan had on Democrats’ ability to convert votes into legislative seats. 305 The plaintiffs
contended that “an efficiency gap in the range of 7% to 10% should trigger
constitutional scrutiny.”306
The Court vacated and remanded the case, unanimously holding that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to allege a statewide injury.307 Although the Court explicitly declined
to answer whether partisan-gerrymandering claims were justiciable,308 it
simultaneously ported some arguments identified in Vieth from judicialmanageability grounds to standing grounds.
In Vieth, for example, Justice Scalia objected to the plaintiffs’ effects test, which
required court intervention when a map “thwart[s] the . . . ability to translate a
majority of votes into a majority of seats.”309 Justice Scalia opined that statewide
analyses are not judicially manageable because “[p]olitical parties do not compete
for the highest statewide vote totals or the highest mean district vote percentages:
They compete for specific seats.”310 He also observed that “political groups that tend
to cluster (as is the case with Democratic voters in cities)” may have their voting
power diluted by “what might be called a ‘natural’ packing effect” apart from any
partisan objectives.311 This too, Justice Scalia argued, made judicial review an
impossible undertaking for courts.
In Gill, a unanimous Court rejected plaintiffs’ effects test for similar reasons but
on different grounds.312 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts observed that
statewide asymmetry measures reveal “the effect that a gerrymander has on the

300. Compare Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 301 (2004) (plurality opinion), with id. at
313 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
301. See infra text accompanying notes 302–320 (discussing the Court’s approach in Gill
v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018)).
302. 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
303. Id. at 1923–24.
304. Id. at 1924.
305. Id. at 1933.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1933–34.
308. Id. at 1929.
309. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 268 (2004) (plurality opinion).
310. Id. at 289 (quoting Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for
Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1,
60 (1985)).
311. Id. at 290.
312. Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1933–34.
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fortunes of political parties,” but not “the effect that a gerrymander has on the votes
of particular citizens.”313 This meant the plaintiffs were not measuring a relevant
injury for standing. Chief Justice Roberts also pointed to one plaintiff in particular—
William Whitford—who lived in a district where “Democrats are ‘naturally’ packed
due to their geographic concentration.”314 As the Chief Justice noted, “even
plaintiffs’ own demonstration map resulted in a virtually identical district for him.”315
To demonstrate the cognizable constitutional harm of individual partisan vote
dilution, a plaintiff would need to show that “the particular composition of the voter’s
own district . . . cause[d] his vote . . . to carry less weight than it would carry in
another, hypothetical district.”316 Because a “single statewide measure of partisan
advantage”317 did not identify how gerrymandering affected the plaintiffs in this kind
of “personal and individual way,”318 they could not demonstrate Article III
standing.319
Unlike the categorical political question decision that the Vieth plurality would
have made regarding a whole class of hypothetical cases, the Gill decision rested its
standing decision “on the understanding that [the Court] lack[ed] jurisdiction to
decide [the case before it], much less to draw speculative and advisory conclusions
regarding others.”320 The Gill opinion rightly limited itself to the specific facts, legal
arguments, and perceived shortcomings of the specific case before it.
Gill’s careful and considered reliance on standing doctrine makes Chief Justice
Roberts’ sweeping decision in Rucho v. Common Cause all the more surprising. In
Rucho, the Court faced a congressional map drawn with the indisputable purpose of
conferring partisan advantage,321 and the plaintiffs brought district-specific partisangerrymandering claims that demonstrated how the vote split in their individual
districts compared to thousands of hypothetical alternative districts in which they
might have been placed in the absence of the pursuit of partisan advantage.322 In

313. Id. at 1933.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 1931.
317. Id. at 1933.
318. Id. at 1929 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992)).
319. Gill is somewhat unclear whether the issue for naturally packed plaintiffs is truly a
problem of injury in fact or rather a problem of traceability. Compare id. at 1933 (stating that
“the fundamental problem” is that plaintiff’s case is “about group political interests, not
individual legal rights”), with id. at 1924 (noting that Whitford “acknowledged . . . that [his
district] is, under any plausible circumstances, a heavily Democratic district.”) (emphasis
added), and id. at 1933 (noting that, “[b]y all accounts, Act 43 [did] not affec[t] Whitford’s
individual vote”) (emphasis added).
320. Id. at 1931.
321. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019). North Carolina General
Assembly’s redistricting committee adopted criteria that included a provision—subtly titled
“Partisan Advantage”—that expressly required the creation of a map that would elect 10
Republicans and 3 Democrats. Id. at 2510 (Kagan, J., dissenting). One of the committee
members explained these numbers were chosen because he “d[id] not believe [it was] possible
to draw a map with 11 Republicans and 2 Democrats.” Id.
322. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 893–94 (M.D.N.C. 2018),
vacated and remanded, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
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short, the Rucho plaintiffs provided precisely the evidence that the unanimous Court
in Gill had requested: a measure to show that the particular composition of individual
voters’ districts caused their votes to carry less weight than they would carry in
districts not drawn for the purpose of partisan advantage.
Nonetheless, Rucho lurches away from the standing-driven and case-limited
conception of judicial power expressed in Gill. Rucho (1) relies upon arguments
presented in Gill as posing standing problems, (2) cites to standing case law, and (3)
ignores the implications of standing doctrine for the justiciability question posed by
the case.323
First, Rucho abandons the progress made in Gill. Whereas Gill moved some of
Vieth’s objections from abstract political question grounds to constitutional and casespecific standing grounds, Rucho engages in the opposite exercise. Consider Rucho’s
objection that partisan-gerrymandering claims “invariably sound in a desire for
proportional representation” and “rest on an instinct that groups with a certain level
of political support should enjoy a commensurate level of political power and
influence.”324 Apart from the fact that these statements are demonstrably false,325
they raise objections that were already framed in Gill as presenting a barrier to
standing.
In Gill, the Court observed that challenges to the overall allocation of political
power by a redistricting map assert only a “generalized grievance” rather than an
individual harm.326 Thus, litigants were apprised that any future claim must sound in
individual harm and any claim that raised the kind of “generalized grievances” at
issue in Gill would likely be dismissed for lack of standing.327
In response, the Rucho plaintiffs presented theories, arguments, and evidence
rooted in individual harm.328 Rather than engaging with the showing in the case
before it, however, the Court moved its objections back to political question grounds,
freeing the majority to make abstract, incorrect, and now-unchallengeable assertions
about the intrinsic nature of “all” partisan-gerrymandering claims (rather than
leaving future decisions to test new theories or new facts).329
Second, Rucho further blurs the line between standing doctrine and the political
question doctrine by relying almost solely upon standing case law to establish the
relevant jurisdictional standard.330 Just as Allen v. Wright inappropriately expanded
standing doctrine to cover political question purposes,331 Rucho parrots standing’s
purposes in an attempt to manufacture a passable doctrinal veneer for identifying
political questions.332 Chief Justice Roberts cites Flast v. Cohen for the proposition
that “federal courts can address only questions ‘historically viewed as capable of

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

See infra text accompanying notes 324–339.
139 S. Ct. at 2499.
See infra text accompanying notes 535–546.
Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930, 1931, 1933 (2018).
Id. at 1932.
See supra text accompanying note 322; infra text accompanying notes 535–537.
See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499, 2501.
See id. at 2494.
See supra text accompanying notes 128–140.
See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2493–94.
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resolution through the judicial process’”333 and DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno for
the requirement that the questions “presented in a ‘case’ or ‘controversy’” be “of a
Judiciary Nature.”334 But Flast and DaimlerChrysler are cases on standing.335
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts raises this standing case law but then ignores its
implications. To the extent Flast and DaimlerChrysler do any relevant jurisdictional
gatekeeping, their role was already settled in Gill: determining whether individual
partisan vote dilution qualifies as a cognizable constitutional harm sufficient to
generate a case or controversy under Article III.336 On this question, the Gill Court
unanimously agreed: yes, partisan vote dilution can constitute a cognizable harm
sufficient to satisfy Article III if the plaintiff can show that packing or cracking
caused his vote to carry less weight than it would in another, hypothetical district.337
In short, if “judicial manageability” means only that a question was “historically
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process,” 338 then political
question doctrine extends no further than standing doctrine and Rucho could not
render nonjusticiable that which Gill had already deemed cognizable. If, on the other
hand, “judicial manageability” means that generating legal standards is “impossible,”
then the political question doctrine demands precisely what Article III prohibits:
opining about cases and controversies not before the Court.339
Thus, the modern political question doctrine serves no independent jurisdictional
purpose that standing doctrine does not better serve and undermines the purposes that
the Court ascribes to Article III’s case or controversy language.
B. The Political Finality Doctrine
(Conflicting Constitutional Authority to Decide Issues Within a Case)
The political finality doctrine340 requires a court to treat certain factual
determinations (or decisions regarding mixed questions of fact and law) made by the
political branches as conclusive in the course of resolving a case before it.341 This

333. Id. at 2493–94 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)).
334. Id. 2494 (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006)).
335. See DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S. at 342 (“[B]efore we [decide the constitutional
question], we must find that the question is presented in a ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ that is, in
James Madison’s words, ‘of a Judiciary Nature.’ That requires plaintiffs, as the parties now
asserting federal jurisdiction, to carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article
III.” (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911)) (emphasis added)); Flast, 392 U.S. at 98–101.
336. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929–31 (2018).
337. See id. at 1931; id. at 1934 (Kagan, J., concurring).
338. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2393–94 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 95).
339. See infra text accompanying notes 539–546 (discussing how Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484,
makes abstract and false statements about both the partisan gerrymandering claims before it
and partisan gerrymandering claims in general); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267,
292–301 (2004) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that the absence of a standard that the Court
was willing to accept in the case at hand meant that standards were inherently impossible to
generate).
340. Professor Grove calls this the “traditional political question doctrine”; Professor
Harrison refers to this as “non-judicial finality.” See supra notes 244–245.
341. Grove, supra note 3, at 1911, 1918.
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doctrine arises only when a political decision-maker is empowered by the
Constitution to exercise a function that might traditionally be considered
adjudicatory: deciding an issue raised within a case before the judiciary with final
binding effect.342
In such situations, the court attributes nonjudicial finality343 only to the resolution
of the discrete nonjusticiable issue “and then [goes] on to resolve [any] remaining
factual and legal issues in the case.”344 Like the political remedies doctrine, the
political finality doctrine does not operate as a jurisdictional bar. “[A] court can have
jurisdiction to decide a case that turns on [a] nonjusticiab[le] [issue] . . . .”345 For
example, “[w]hen a plaintiff with a meritorious claim relies on the political branches’
recognition of a foreign government, . . . the [political finality] doctrine underlies
part of the court’s reasoning in a successful suit.”346
Professor Grove makes precisely this point in discussing Luther v. Borden.347
There, Borden broke into Luther’s house to arrest him for unlawfully supporting a
rebellion group that claimed it was the new, legitimate government of Rhode
Island.348 Luther sued Borden for trespass, and Borden defended himself by saying
he was acting on behalf of the existing charter government, which had imposed
martial law.349 Luther argued that the charter government was not the true
government of the state.350 The Court held that it would accept Congress’s
determination on this question (which government controlled Rhode Island) as
conclusive.351 Yet, as Professor Grove notes, “[t]he Court then went on to decide the
major legal issue in the case: whether the charter government was justified in
declaring martial law during the [rebellion].”352
More recently, in Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I)353 and Zivotofsky v. Kerry
(Zivotofsky II),354 the Supreme Court employed a somewhat similar approach,
treating a decision by a political actor regarding a political question as conclusive
within a case. Zivotofsky I & II involved a conflict between Congress and the
President over the political status of Israel. Congress enacted a law requiring the
Secretary of State, upon the request of a citizen born in Jerusalem, to record the place
of birth in his or her passport as “Israel.”355 The State Department’s own internal

342. Harrison, supra note 3, at 505.
343. See id. at 460.
344. Grove, supra note 3, at 1923; see also Harrison, supra note 3, at 468, 487.
345. Harrison, supra note 3, at 496.
346. Id.; see also id. at 500–01, 504 (discussing Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635
(1854)).
347. Grove, supra note 3, at 1924–28 (discussing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1
(1849)).
348. Luther, 48 U.S. at 34–38.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 42, 47.
352. Grove, supra note 3, at 1927.
353. 566 U.S. 189 (2012).
354. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
355. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 191.
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rules, however, directed passport officials to record “Jerusalem” and “not write Israel
or Jordan” when recording the citizen’s birthplace on their passport.356
The Court retained jurisdiction over the case, holding that the task before it did
not entail answering a political question (“to decide the political status of
Jerusalem”),357 but rather a legal one (“[to] decide . . . whether the statute is
constitutional”).358 After interpreting the Constitution to determine which branch—
Congress or the President—should be entrusted with the resolution of the political
question,359 the Court would then treat the proper political branch’s decision as
conclusive with respect to the nonjusticiable political issue and go on to resolve
the case.360
If the statute “impermissibly intrudes upon Presidential powers under the
Constitution,” then “the law must be invalidated and Zivotofsky’s case should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.”361 But if the law “does not trench on the
President’s powers, then the Secretary must be ordered to issue Zivotofsky a passport
that complies with [that law].”362
Using its normal tools of constitutional interpretation, the Court eventually went
on to decide that the President should be entrusted with the finality decision.363
Unsurprisingly, some factors it considered were akin to the Baker factors. Although
the Constitution did not contain an explicit textual commitment of the recognition
power to the Executive,364 the Court interpreted the Constitution to entrust this
function exclusively to the President.365 In so interpreting, the Court relied on the
textual commitment of related functions and powers,366 the difficulty Congress
would have in “tak[ing] the decisive, unequivocal action necessary,”367 the need for
the President’s decision to be “conclusive” and “obligatory on the people and
government of the Union,”368 and the importance of the nation speaking with one
voice in foreign affairs.369

356. Id. at 192.
357. Id. at 195 (quoting Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97, 103 (D.D.C.
2007), vacated and remanded, 566 U.S. 189 (2012)).
358. Id. at 196.
359. See id. at 196–202.
360. See id. at 196; see also Grove, supra note 3, at 1923; Harrison, supra note 3, at
468, 487.
361. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 196.
362. Id.
363. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2080 (2015).
364. Id. at 2084–85 (“Despite the importance of the recognition power in foreign relations,
the Constitution does not use the term ‘recognition,’ either in Article II or elsewhere.”).
365. Id. at 2088.
366. See id. at 2084–86. Compare id., with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)
(discussing importance of “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue”).
367. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2086.
368. Id. at 2088. Compare id., with Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (discussing importance of “an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made”).
369. See Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2086 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S.
396, 424 (2003)). Compare id., with Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (discussing “the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question”).
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The political finality doctrine operates in just this manner. To determine whether
a nonjusticiable political issue has been raised in a case (and whether finality should
be attributed to the political branches’ resolution of that issue rather than the judicial
branch’s), a court must examine “the textual, structural, and historical evidence put
forward by the parties”370 to “look[] for indicia that a political actor has been given
authority to apply law to fact conclusively.”371 As Chief Justice Roberts succinctly
stated in Zivotofsky I, “This is what courts do.”372
Using such “familiar principles of constitutional interpretation . . . is enough to
establish that [a] case does not ‘turn on standards that defy judicial application.’”373
Rather than being independent jurisdictional tests, the Baker factors simply provide
“indicators that a political actor [should have] the last word in the application of law
to fact”374 within the context of a given case.375 Whatever textual, historical, or
functional factors the Court relies upon, however, the reason for deferring to a
political decision (or declining to do so) constitutes a substantive exercise in
constitutional interpretation.376
In applying the doctrine, however, the Court must remember that “[b]eing held to
a rule and being called on to determine whether it has been violated are very different
functions.”377 The political finality doctrine is not applicable in many of the cases
where the modern doctrine is thought to apply—namely, cases in which government
decision-makers are the ones subject to liability.378 “[P]otential tortfeasors do not

370. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012).
371. Harrison, supra note 3, at 518.
372. 566 U.S. at 201.
373. Id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211).
374. Harrison, supra note 3, at 498.
375. The political finality doctrine also provides an analytical framework that
complements another one of the Court’s most puzzling separation of powers problems: the
meaning of United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). The political finality
doctrine implicitly recognizes that there may be times when political actors attempt to decide
dispositive issues within cases without indicia that doing so is consistent with their
constitutional function. Chief Justice Roberts posits a hypothetical of this nature in Bank
Markazi v. Peterson:
Imagine your neighbor sues you, claiming that your fence is on his property. His
evidence is a letter from the previous owner of your home, accepting your
neighbor’s version of the facts. Your defense is an official county map, which
under state law establishes the boundaries of your land. The map shows the fence
on your side of the property line. You also argue that your neighbor’s claim is
six months outside the statute of limitations.
Now imagine that while the lawsuit is pending, your neighbor persuades the
legislature to enact a new statute. The new statute provides that for your case,
and your case alone, a letter from one neighbor to another is conclusive of
property boundaries, and the statute of limitations is one year longer. Your
neighbor wins. Who would you say decided your case: the legislature, which
targeted your specific case and eliminated your specific defenses so as to ensure
your neighbor’s victory, or the court, which presided over the fait accompli?
136 S. Ct. 1310, 1329 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
376. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
377. Harrison, supra note 3, at 518.
378. Id.
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conclusively decide whether they have committed a tort.”379 The political finality
doctrine does not make political actors judges in their own cause.
***
Gerrymandering helps illustrate the meaning and potential application of the
political finality doctrine. Both Chief Justice Roberts (in Rucho) and Justice Scalia
(in Vieth) raised the history, text, and function of the Elections Clause 380 in their
respective gerrymandering cases,381 yet neither claimed that the Elections Clause
could provide the basis for holding partisan-gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable.382
Instead, both rested their holdings on the supposed “unmanageability” of such
claims.383 Why?
The political finality doctrine reveals why the “Elections Clause justification” for
nonjusticiability fails: the Elections Clause itself does not entrust a relevant “issue”
to a political actor or provide a relevant “political decision” for federal courts to apply
on the merits in the course of resolving the constitutional claim entrusted to them to
decide. The question in Rucho was whether partisan gerrymandering violates the
First or Fourteenth Amendments. The answer to that question would place
constitutional limits on legislative redistricting decisions by state or federal actors.
The Elections Clause says nothing about that constitutional question.
First, the history of the Elections Clause fails to offer dispositive guidance. As
Rucho recounts, the practice of gerrymandering “was known in the Colonies prior to
Independence” and made an appearance in the first congressional elections ever, with
Patrick Henry attempting to gerrymander a Virginia district to favor James Monroe
over James Madison.384 And during the ratification debates over electoral districting
there was “[no] suggestion that the federal courts had a role to play.”385

379. Id.
380. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
381. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494–96 (2019); Vieth v. Jubelirer,
541 U.S. 267, 274–77 (2004) (plurality opinion).
382. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495–96 (“[T]he Elections Clause [does not] . . . set aside
[political-gerrymandering claims] as questions that only Congress can resolve. . . . But the
history is not irrelevant.”); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 275 (“It is significant that the Framers provided
a remedy for such practices in the Constitution.”).
383. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494 (“Among the political question cases this Court has
identified are those that lack ‘judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
[them].’ . . . The question here is whether [partisan-gerrymandering claims] are claims of legal
right, resolvable according to legal principles, or political questions that must find their
resolution elsewhere.” (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962))); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277–78 (“In Baker v. Carr, we set forth six
independent tests for the existence of a political question . . . . The second is at issue here . . . .”
(citation omitted)).
384. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494. It is perhaps more accurate to say that “gerrymandering”—
rather than “partisan gerrymandering”—was familiar to the Framers. The Framers notably
failed to anticipate the rise and power of political parties in the constitutional system they had
devised.
385. Id. at 2496.
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But the ratification history of the Elections Clause predates the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. As Chief Justice Roberts acknowledges, the Supreme
Court went on to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to impose constitutional limits
on redistricting practices such as quantitative vote dilution and racial
gerrymandering.386 Asked to hold that the history of the Elections Clause definitively
sets aside issues such as partisan gerrymandering as “questions that only Congress
can resolve,” the Rucho majority rightfully offers a firm and plain response: “[w]e
do not agree.”387
Second, consider the text and structure of the Elections Clause. The Clause
“assigns to state legislatures the power to prescribe the ‘Times, Places and Manner
of holding Elections’ for Members of Congress, while giving Congress the power to
‘make or alter’ any such regulations.”388 That Congress has the power to set standards
for state legislatures conducting congressional redistricting or even the power to
conduct congressional redistricting itself via the Elections Clause has no bearing on
whether the First Amendment or Equal Protection Clause impose separate, outside
constraints on the exercise of that power (either by state legislatures or by Congress).
For example, how could an interpretation of the Elections Clause strip jurisdiction
from federal courts with respect to gerrymandering of state legislative districts
(which Congress cannot regulate via the Elections Clause)?389 Rucho does not say.

386. See id.
387. Id. at 2495.
388. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1).
389. See Derek T. Muller, Politics as Usual, PUB. DISCOURSE (July 7, 2019),
https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2019/07/54460/ [https://perma.cc/3T78-FFLY].
That Congress cannot regulate state legislative redistricting via the Elections Clause does
not necessarily mean that Congress cannot regulate state legislative redistricting at all—only
that the Elections Clause cannot provide the vehicle for doing so. For example, Congress
might rely upon the Guarantee Clause as a positive source of (currently) unreviewable
authority for regulating state legislative redistricting. See Matt Ford, Make the Guarantee
Clause Great Again, NEW REPUBLIC (July 17, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/154486
/guarantee-clause-hindering-gerrymandering-reform
[https://perma.cc/CX55-HW35]
(observing that Congress could “invoke the clause to forbid state legislatures from enacting
the kinds of partisan gerrymanders that Rucho now blocks the federal courts from stopping,”
and that holding such a law unconstitutional would require the Court “to make Guarantee
Clause claims justiciable again”).
Congress might also rely upon its enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Rucho does not purport to interpret the Equal Protection Clause
on the merits. 139 S. Ct. at 2508 (remanding “with instructions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction”). And a majority of the Court in both Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551, 551
n.7 (1999), and Rucho recognized a supposed distinction between “constitutional” and
“unconstitutional” political gerrymandering under the Equal Protection Clause, 139 S. Ct. at
2497 (favorably citing Hunt to establish the proposition that legislatures may engage in some
partisan gerrymandering, thereby making the central justiciability problem one of determining
when partisan gerrymandering has gone too far). In other words, Hunt and Rucho rest upon
the assumption that partisan gerrymandering can violate the Equal Protection Clause if it goes
too far, that the Court is incapable of articulating standards for when partisan gerrymandering
goes too far, and that it is a distinctly “political question” to decide how far is “too far.” Rucho,
139 S. Ct. at 2497 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
All of this suggests that Congress might invoke its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
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Third, the text, structure, and operation of the Clause all shed light on its function,
and the function of the Clause does not preclude judicial review. That is because—
as the political finality doctrine instructs—there is a key difference between an
actor’s discretion and the application of legal standards to that discretion.390
It is one thing to subject state legislative power to oversight through federal
legislative preemption (the function of the Elections Clause). It is another thing
entirely to preclude state (or even federal) legislative power from federal judicial
oversight (the function of the judiciary enforcing the First and/or Fourteenth
Amendments).
In other words, the question, “Does partisan gerrymandering violate the Equal
Protection Clause?” is a different question than, “What standard for congressional
redistricting does Congress prefer?” For one, the answer to the first question places
a permanent constitutional boundary on the exercise of legislative discretion (by
federal or state actors), whereas the other constitutes a fluid reflection of that exercise
of legislative discretion. Nor does a court articulating a constitutional standard usurp
the federal or state legislative power to articulate statutory redistricting standards.
Consider an example from Rucho itself: the enforcement of population equality
under Article I, Section 2 (for congressional districts) and the Fourteenth
Amendment (for state legislative districts). The Framers were aware at the time of
ratification of the risk of malapportionment, and the Elections Clause was thought to
provide Congress a means of protecting against this.391 Congress even exercised this
power for a period of time, enacting federal statutes that required population equality
in congressional redistricting.392 Yet, none of that precluded the Court from
interpreting Article I, Section 2 and the Equal Protection Clause to require population
equality in congressional and state legislative districts. 393
In a similar vein, Congress’s power to enact the Voting Rights Act under the
Fifteenth Amendment did not somehow foreclose the Court’s power to adjudicate
racial-vote-dilution or racial-sorting claims arising under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.394 If Congress undertook its own congressional redistricting
pursuant to the Elections Clause and drew congressional districts with the purpose
and effect of diluting the electoral influence of racial minorities, no one would
believe its decisions were exempt from the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments or
beyond the reach of the federal courts. Nor is there any reason to think that
Congress’s power to take the lead in drawing its own districts would somehow place
racial vote dilution by state legislators outside the judicial ken.
Thus, Congress’s latent power to regulate partisan gerrymandering of
congressional districts does nothing to foreclose the Court’s power to adjudicate
partisan-gerrymandering claims arising under the First or Fourteenth

authority to articulate how far is “too far.” To declare such a law unconstitutional, the Court
would need to pass on the merits of the question it held nonjusticiable in Rucho.
390. See Harrison, supra note 3, at 518.
391. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495.
392. Id.
393. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,
7–8 (1964).
394. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928 (1995); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 628
(1982); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 349 (1960).
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Amendments.395 Chief Justice Roberts notes in Rucho that “Congress has regularly
exercised its Elections Clause power, including to address partisan gerrymandering”
by enacting (and then repealing) statutory contiguity and compactness
requirements.396 But that fact neither strengthens nor weakens the conclusion that the
First or Fourteenth Amendments prohibit partisan gerrymandering. It has no bearing
on those questions at all.
Federal legislative preemption and federal judicial review are simply different
constitutional functions. The Elections Clause does not render federal and state
election laws immune to judicial review any more than the Commerce Clause renders
federal and state economic regulations immune to judicial review. The fact that a
political actor possesses a power does not remove exercises of that power from the
application of legal standards.397 The Elections Clause is no exception.
The political finality doctrine also explains why the application of a standard
prohibiting partisan suppression in redistricting is not tantamount to displacing
legislative discretion or imposing a singular vision of electoral “fairness.”398 When
it comes to public-employee hiring, it is a political question to ask what
characteristics we are looking for in a candidate and how we should balance them in
light of the candidates available.399 It is a legal question to ask whether the
government violated the Constitution by discriminating on the basis of political
preference.400 It is a political question to ask what the best policies and practices are
for encouraging productivity, quality, and morale. It is a legal question to ask if a
superior “fail[ed] to hold a birthday party for a public employee . . . to punish her for
exercising her free speech rights.”401
Like many areas in which executive and legislative actors operate, there are
billions of appropriate options available to mapmakers, and selecting among them is
entrusted to their discretion.402 But the Court does not need a theory of ideal political
representation or a best map or a “substantive definition of fairness”403 to intervene

395. The Court could have interpreted the First Amendment or Equal Protection Clause
not to impose any outside limits on partisan vote dilution, but this would be a decision on the
merits rather than a jurisdictional decision under the modern political question doctrine.
396. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495.
397. See Harrison, supra note 3, at 518.
398. See id. at 483.
399. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (“The province of the
court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or
executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.”).
400. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).
401. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 75 n.8 (1990) (quoting Rutan v.
Republican Party of Ill., 868 F.2d 943, 954 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989), aff’d in part and rev’d in part,
497 U.S. 62). As the Supreme Court noted in Rutan, the Seventh Circuit erred when it “chose
to defer to the political process in [this] area” out of concerns about “excessive interference
by the Federal Judiciary.” Id.
402. Wendy K. Tam Cho & Yan Y. Liu, Toward a Talismanic Redistricting Tool: A
Computational Method for Identifying Extreme Redistricting Plans, 15 ELECTION L. J. 351,
360 (2016) (using supercomputers to generate “more than a billion” comparison maps).
403. Contra Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2500 (2019) (“Deciding among .
. . different visions of fairness . . . poses basic questions that are political, not legal.”); Vieth
v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“No substantive definition
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when evidence shows that voters were invidiously targeted for disfavored
treatment.404 Voters may not have “any constitutional entitlement to electoral
success” or any constitutional right to be placed in any particular election district,
“but they should have a constitutional expectation against the government
purposefully burdening their representational interests based on their partisan
affiliation and beliefs.”405
Rucho was correct to observe that the Elections Clause empowers Congress to
conduct its own redistricting or even to set its own substantive standards of “fairness”
in congressional redistricting.406 Rucho was also correct to observe that state
legislators—like federal legislators—are free to decide among “different visions of
fairness” when redistricting, such as drawing competitive districts, drawing districts
that allocate seats by vote share, or drawing districts that adhere to traditional
districting criteria.407 The choice among these priorities and theories of
representation pose “basic questions that are political, not legal.”408
But the issue before the Court in Rucho was not whether the challenged districts
were fair according to any statutory standard imposed by Congress pursuant to the
Elections Clause; the issue was whether targeting certain voters for partisan vote
dilution violates the First Amendment or Equal Protection Clause.
Rucho deflects attention from this core constitutional question by pretending it
has been answered by precedent.409 The Court then redirects the reader’s attention to
a discretionary question, writing that the “central problem” posed by the case is
“determining when political gerrymandering has gone too far”410 and answering that

of fairness in districting seems to command general assent.”).
404. See Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville,
508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (“When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult
for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a member
of the former group seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege that he would have
obtained the benefit but for the barrier in order to establish standing. The ‘injury in fact’ in an
equal protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the
imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.”).
405. Michael S. Kang, Gerrymandering and the Constitutional Norm Against Government
Partisanship, 116 MICH. L. REV. 351, 383 (2017); see also Justin Levitt, Intent Is Enough:
Invidious Partisanship in Redistricting, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1993 (2018); Michael
Parsons, Clearing the Political Thicket: Why Political Gerrymandering for Partisan
Advantage Is Unconstitutional, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1107 (2016) [hereinafter
Parsons, Partisan Advantage].
406. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508.
407. See id. at 2500.
408. Id.; accord Parsons, Partisan Advantage, supra note 405, at 1138–47 (distinguishing
between legitimate and nondiscriminatory theories of representation—such as
competitiveness, proportionality, etc.—and the illegitimate, discriminatory goal of partisan
advantage).
409. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497–98 (“The ‘central problem’ is not determining whether
a jurisdiction has engaged in partisan gerrymandering.” (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267, 296 (2004) (plurality opinion))).
410. Id. at 2497 (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 296).
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question is only possible “after determining how to define fairness.”411 That is
not true.
A legislative decision to adhere to traditional criteria, for example, is a political
decision, and one that raises a wide range of additional choices: Which traditional
criteria does the legislature wish to adhere to? Compactness? Contiguity? Political
subdivision lines? Notable geographic features? How does the legislature wish to
prioritize or balance these criteria?
Even prioritizing traditional criteria, however, does not require or preclude taking
partisan implications into effect. Legislators might adhere to traditional criteria
without considering the partisan implications of doing so; legislators might adhere
to traditional criteria in ways that enhance political competitiveness; or legislators
might adhere to traditional criteria in ways likely to produce a delegation that reflects
statewide voting strength. All of these reflect neutral, nondiscriminatory “visions of
fairness”—and the choice among them is rightly deemed “political,” not “legal.” If,
however, legislators adhere to traditional criteria in ways that are intended to
suppress the influence of partisan opponents, then a constitutional question enters
the picture.412
Thus, holding partisan vote dilution unconstitutional does not impose a singular
“vision[] of fairness” upon legislators. 413 There may be billions of maps that reflect
thousands of different priority rankings among dozens of different theories of fair
representation.414 A world in which legislators can choose among billions of options
is hardly a world in which the Court has “countermand[ed] the Framers’ decision to
entrust districting [decisions] to political entities.”415 The Rucho plaintiffs presented
a method for measuring vote dilution based on whatever theory of fairness a state
legislature (or even Congress) preferred416—this left only a single question: does
partisan vote dilution violate the Equal Protection Clause, First Amendment, or any
other constitutional provision?417 The answer to that question involved no more than

411. Id. at 2497, 2501.
412. Cf. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 799 (2017)
(“Traditional redistricting principles . . . are numerous and malleable. . . . By deploying those
factors in various combinations and permutations, a State could construct a plethora of
potential maps that look consistent with traditional, race-neutral principles. . . . For these
reasons, a conflict or inconsistency between the enacted plan and traditional redistricting
criteria is not a threshold requirement or a mandatory precondition in order for a challenger to
establish a claim of racial gerrymandering.”); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 298 (“[P]acking and cracking,
whether intentional or no, are quite consistent with adherence to compactness and respect for
political subdivision lines.” (emphasis added)).
413. Contra Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500.
414. See Cho & Liu, supra note 402, at 360.
415. Contra Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497.
416. See id. at 2520–21 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing how the outlier method uses a
State’s own criteria of fairness—save for partisan advantage—as a baseline for measuring
dilution).
417. The Court unanimously held in Gill v. Whitford that vote dilution could constitute a
cognizable constitutional harm. See 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1931 (2018). The question before the
Court in Rucho was whether the intentional infliction of this harm violated the Equal
Protection Clause, First Amendment, or any other constitutional provision—a merits question
involving constitutional interpretation. See 139 S. Ct. at 2514–15 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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routine constitutional interpretation—a judicial task the Elections Clause cannot
preclude.
IV. JUDICIAL POWER AND POLITICAL INTERPRETATION
The modern political question doctrine carves out special categories of
constitutional law for interpretative “self-monitoring” by the political branches.418
These categories include cases arising under the Guarantee Clause, impeachment
cases, certain cases relating to foreign affairs, 419 and now political-gerrymandering
cases. Unlike the political remedies doctrine and the political finality doctrine, this
interpretive strand has no history in the traditional political question cases and only
emerges after Baker.420 And, as Part I discussed, this modern doctrine has
increasingly embraced only the first two Baker factors: “textual allocation” and
“judicial unmanageability.”421
In Rucho v. Common Cause, a majority of the Supreme Court held for the first
time that it lacked jurisdiction over a case on the basis of a claim’s unmanageability
alone.422 This new and unprecedented development does not go unnoticed in Justice
Kagan’s dissent,423 but its gravity (and irony) does. For while the dissent debates the
majority over whether political-gerrymandering claims are manageable,424 it fails to
ask a predicate question: whether manageability can operate as a standalone test of
jurisdiction. Declining jurisdiction in the face of a cognizable case or controversy
stands in tension with the Court’s responsibilities under Article III,425 and it is not at
all clear that the majority’s decision to refuse a claim based on manageability alone
is reconcilable with its constitutional obligations under existing law.
Rucho purports to define the circumstances under which the Court lacks
interpretive authority over a case due to unmanageability (i.e., when a claim is not
“resolvable according to legal principles”),426 but this “exception” to the Court’s
constitutional duty to decide cognizable cases does not itself provide a manageable
standard that operates “according to legal principles.” The majority’s ouroborian
reasoning reveals as much about the inanity of the modern political question doctrine

418. Henkin, supra note 184, at 599; see also Seidman, supra note 39, at 448–58.
419. See Seidman, supra note 39, at 455–56.
420. Grove, supra note 3, at 1911–13.
421. See supra text accompanying notes 51–57.
422. 139 S. Ct. at 2509, 2515 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
423. Id.
424. Compare id. at 2502 (majority opinion) (“Appellees and the dissent propose a number
of ‘tests’ for evaluating partisan gerrymandering claims, but none meets the need for a limited
and precise standard that is judicially discernible and manageable.”), with id. at 2516 (Kagan,
J., dissenting) (“But in throwing up its hands, the majority misses something under its nose:
What it says can’t be done has been done. Over the past several years, federal courts across
the country . . . have largely converged on a standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering
claims . . . .”).
425. See Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 194 (2012); Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs.,
Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 274 (2008); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
426. See 139 S. Ct. at 2494 (emphasis in original).
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as it does about the unexpected simplicity of resolving political-gerrymandering
claims.
A. The Political Interpretation Doctrine?
(Conflicting Constitutional Authority to Interpret the Constitution)
If there is a “political remedies doctrine” to guide judicial remedial authority and
a “political finality doctrine” to meter judicial decisional authority, could there also
be a “political interpretation doctrine” to regulate judicial interpretive authority?
Perhaps. But it would look nothing like the modern political question doctrine. Under
the modern doctrine, the judicial branch takes almost exclusive control over all
aspects of the interpretive power (legal and political) and then carves out categorical
jurisdictional exceptions to that absolute power.
1. Principled (Non)Deference and Construction:
The Duty “to Say What the Law Is”
The traditional political question cases involved substantive nonjusticiability,
allocating the most practical and discretionary aspects of decision-making to political
actors within the context of cases over which courts retained jurisdiction and ultimate
adjudicative authority.427 Following this approach allows the federal courts to retain
absolute control over the core exercise of their power while extending principled
deference to political actors with respect to peripheral (but still legitimate) exercises
of the judicial power.
Under the political remedies doctrine, for example, the most pragmatic remedial
design questions would go to the political branches, but courts would still decide
constitutional sufficiency.428 Under the political finality doctrine, issues arising
within cases that are more appropriately resolved by the political branches would go
to the relevant actors, but courts would still decide constitutional cases on the
merits.429
To track this logic, a political interpretation doctrine would have to be both
shallower (nonjurisdictional) and wider (noncategorical). It would also need to retain
control over core interpretive functions and extend greater deference to political
actors over the more inherently practical and normative aspects of the judiciary’s
interpretive powers, such as the construction of constitutional doctrine.430
The judge-made gloss of constitutional doctrine—the great body of constitutional
law—stands separate and apart from the Constitution itself.431 As Professor Louis

427. See supra Sections II.C, III.B. These cannot—and should not—be understood as fixed
conceptual categories with firm boundaries between the legal and practical in any of these
contexts: remedial, decisional, or interpretive. They are all contestable and dependent on
power, legitimacy, and whether coordinate actors appear to be operating in good faith.
428. See supra Section II.C.
429. See supra Section III.B.
430. See Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics, supra note 209, at 662–63; Seidman,
supra note 39, at 469–70.
431. See Seidman, supra note 39, at 469 nn.116–19 (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 66 (1996); Henry P.
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Michael Seidman and other scholars observe, the Constitution’s powerful and
majestic commands—due process, equal protection, freedom of speech—are “too
porous and general to be instantiated in everyday life.”432 The construction of
constitutional doctrine converts the “legal abstractions” of the Constitution into “the
kind of directives necessary to run the vast bureaucracy that is the United States.”433
To do so, “the Justices must necessarily be concerned with extraconstitutional issues
like administrability, coherence, and comprehensibility.”434 And—by definition—
the source of these values, the balance struck, and the ultimate form of the rule
imposed cannot be the Constitution.435
Any kind of political interpretation doctrine—one that would provide principled
deference and greater space for political actors to play a role in shaping constitutional
doctrine at the margins—would invite numerous inquiries beyond the scope of this
Article.436 To question the reach and meaning of the Court’s doctrinal-construction
power would qualify and complicate Marbury’s forceful declaration that “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is.”437
Suffice to say, the Supreme Court has shown little interest in doing such
qualifying or complicating of the extent of its power to construct binding
constitutional doctrine.438 Rather than any kind of principled deference, the Court has
largely adopted a stance of principled nondeference, claiming exclusive control over
constitutional construction almost without exception.
One need not challenge the virtually unqualified reach of the Court’s lawdeclaration power, however, to see how its unwavering commitment to that power
creates tension between the modern doctrine’s categorical approach to jurisdiction
and the rest of the Court’s Article III jurisprudence. Because there is no clean
constitutional dividing line between the political and legal aspects of doctrine

Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975); Akhil Reed
Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000); David A.
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 894 (1996)).
432. Seidman, supra note 39, at 470.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. See id. (“If the Constitution were self-implementing we would not need the doctrine;
because it is not self-implementing, judges must look outside the Constitution for the tools
that will implement it.”).
436. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999) (examining and addressing the numerous questions that would arise from popular
constitutionalism and shared interpretive authority).
437. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
438. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (holding
unconstitutional an attempt by Congress to legislatively overrule Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966)); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512–16, 536 (1997) (holding
unconstitutional an attempt by Congress to legislatively reimpose the compelling interest test
for free-exercise claims after the Court abandoned the approach in Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
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construction,439 manageability cannot offer any principled basis for drawing an
exception to the Court’s default obligation to “say what the law is.” 440
2. Unprincipled Abdication and Manageability:
“This Is Not Law”
As soon as the Court strays from making jurisdictional decisions based on
whether the Constitution itself entrusts decisional authority over an individual case
to the judiciary,441 it subverts core judicial functions required by Article III
(interpreting how the Constitution applies in individual constitutional cases, deciding
those cases on the merits, and providing remedies)442 to extraconstitutional
considerations. There is not and cannot be a principled manageability exception to
the Court’s interpretive or constructive supremacy.
This is what makes the central holding of the Rucho decision (the supposed
unmanageability of crafting judicially enforceable standards) both hollow and
hypocritical. Elevating manageability to be a standalone test of jurisdiction offers no
reasoned basis for determining when to cast off the Court’s interpretive duties.
First, the concept of manageability has no constitutional content; it is pure,
unbridled discretion. Chief Justice Roberts emphasizes in Rucho that “‘judicial
action must be governed by standard, by rule,’ and must be ‘principled, rational, and
based upon reasoned distinctions’ found in the Constitution or laws.”443
Unfortunately, he misses the irony of his decision: if “judicial action must be
governed by standard,” then how does one define “manageability” and decide based
on legal principles when to declare a question “beyond the reach of the federal
courts”?444

439. See Seidman, supra note 39, at 469–72.
440. Cf. id. at 444–65 (observing the inherently unprincipled nature of drawing categorical
exceptions to jurisdiction under the modern political question doctrine).
441. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 3, cls. 6–7.
442. See Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 194 (2012); Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs.,
Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 274 (2007); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
443. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019) (alteration in original)
(emphasis in original) (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278–79 (2004) (plurality
opinion)).
444. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2487. One might say, “tradition.” Id. at 2487, 2493–95
(“[F]ederal courts can address only questions ‘historically viewed as capable of resolution
through the judicial process’” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968))); Vieth, 541
U.S. at 278 (“‘The judicial Power’ created by Article III . . . is the power to act in the manner
traditional for English and American courts.”); see also Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 203–04
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278). But “tradition” does not solve the
riddle.
If the “traditional” manner just means “by standard, by rule,” see Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278,
then the response is circular. In Vieth, for example, Justice Scalia asserts that “to act in the
manner traditional for English and American courts” is to pronounce law that “must be
principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.” Id. This makes manageability the
defining characteristic of tradition, not tradition the defining trait of manageability.
If the “traditional” manner means that federal courts will only resolve the kinds of cases
that came before “the courts of Westminster,” see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
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Manageability cannot be reduced to anything more than a constantly shifting
bundle of practical considerations445 because manageability is, itself, a concern of
constitutional construction. Simply put, “any constitutional provision can be supplied
with working standards of interpretation.”446 One need only examine “the litany of
case law either interpreting the broad language of the due process or equal protection
clauses or establishing standards on which to invoke the first amendment right of
free speech” to recognize “the disingenuousness of the ‘absence-of-standards’
rationale.”447 The Court has held that “excessive” punitive damages can violate due
process (despite providing mere “guideposts” for ascertaining excessiveness),448 and
the Court has recognized that probable cause—for all its central importance to
criminal law—is “a fluid concept . . . not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat
set of legal rules.”449
Even standing “cannot be defined so as to make [its] application . . . a mechanical
exercise.”450 Yet, this “absence of precise definitions . . . hardly leaves courts at
sea.”451 Doctrinal rules and standards have always developed through discrete
decisions over time, and the Court has constructed innumerable legal tests to
operationalize vague and general constitutional commands. It is implausible to
suggest that partisan gerrymandering is uniquely immune to judicial standards.
Indeed, the Rucho majority’s feigned incompetence—its purported inability to
craft a standard—was particularly striking given that numerous federal district courts
had all converged on the same standard for partisan gerrymandering claims in the

McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), then the response cannot
account for the different conception of—and allocation of—authority found in our own
constitutional government. See supra text accompanying notes 76–89. As discussed above,
the role of the federal courts in the school desegregation cases cannot be reconciled with a
strictly colonial-era view of the judicial power. See supra text accompanying notes 76–89.
Nor can such an approach account for the one-person, one-vote doctrine; constitutional racial
vote dilution doctrine; or racial sorting doctrine. See supra text accompanying notes 384–387.
If “manageability” limits federal courts to the kinds of cases that came before English courts,
then a great deal of constitutional doctrine would be “unconstitutional” and much of the
Constitution itself would be a dead letter.
If, however, the “traditional” manner simply means limiting courts to resolving genuine
disputes, then “manageability” offers nothing that standing doctrine does not already provide
and partisan vote dilution claims would be “of a Judiciary Nature,” contrary to the holding in
Rucho. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494 (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.
332, 342 (2006)); supra Section III.A.
445. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1275 (2006) [hereinafter Fallon, Judicial Manageability] (“[I]f the
requirement of judicial manageability applied to the Court’s own decisionmaking process[,]
. . . the criteria by which the Court identifies judicially unmanageable standards might
themselves be disqualified as judicially unmanageable.”).
446. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV.
1031, 1047 (1985).
447. Id. at 1046 (citing Scharpf, supra note 48, 556–57).
448. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–85 (1996).
449. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
450. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
451. Id.
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years leading up to the decision.452 As Justice Kagan points out in her dissent: “[w]hat
[the majority] says can’t be done has been done.”453 The decisions pending before
the Court last term all used a similar three-part test (intent, effect, and causation) to
identify the kind of vote-dilution harm the Court had unanimously deemed a
cognizable constitutional injury in Gill just the term before.454 The three-part test in
Rucho provided an “utterly ordinary” doctrinal standard—“the sort of thing courts
work with every day.”455 Perhaps the Rucho majority found that standard
unacceptable for practical reasons, but that brings us to our next problem.
Second, making manageability a standalone test of jurisdiction opens a rift in the
responsibilities imposed by Article III. Assume for a moment that interpreting the
Constitution to render judgment within the context of specific cognizable cases is the
core of the judicial interpretive function, elaborating broad doctrinal standards within
which legislatures can operate is a generally accepted aspect of that function, and
spelling out detailed and sharp administrative rules is the most practical and political
aspect of the interpretive function.456 If so, “manageability” instructs the Court to
place the exercise of its most constitutionally contestable interpretive power before
the discharge of its core constitutional duty. It places the judge’s practical preference
for a sweeping or sharp rule above the judge’s constitutional obligation to render a
reasoned ruling.457
Rucho offers a prime example. The majority obsesses over the question of how
much partisan gerrymandering is too much,458 contending that all the proffered tests
and standards fail the political question doctrine’s manageability test.459 According
to Chief Justice Roberts, any legal standard that cannot offer an indisputable answer
to this question is not a “principled” or “rational” standard at all.460 Confronted with
Justice Kagan’s objection that “there are other instances in law where matters of
degree are left to the courts,” Chief Justice Roberts responds that judges in such cases
“began with a significant body of law about what constituted a legal violation.”461
But where does the Chief Justice think that “significant body of law” came from?

452. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2516 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
453. Id.
454. See id. at 2514–15.
455. Id. at 2516–17.
456. See supra Section IV.A.1.
457. To be sure, there are good reasons for an apex court like the Supreme Court to
articulate clear constitutional rules, and the benefits of doing so provided part of the
justification for Congress granting the Supreme Court the power of discretionary review
through its certiorari process. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical
Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 44–59 (2009) [hereinafter Grove, Vertical Maximalism].
The question here, however, is whether the Court’s difficulty in crafting an easily
administrable rule can override the Court’s constitutional duty to render a reasoned decision
at all.
458. See, e.g., Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497 (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 420 (2006)).
459. See id. at 2502.
460. See id. at 2507 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality
opinion)).
461. Id. at 2505–06.
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Reasoned decision-making in individual cases is the core judicial function and the
way legal principles develop over time.462 The absence of a clear rule does not signify
the absence of reasoned decision-making, let alone the absence of principled
standards. In response to the majority’s interminable hand-wringing over “how much
is too much,” Justice Kagan offers an answer: “This much is too much.”463 Justice
Kagan’s commitment to resolve the case at hand is arguably more consistent with
the commands of Article III than Chief Justice Roberts’s choice to forgo resolving
the case because he was not satisfied with the political palatability of the standards
on offer.464
None of this is to deny the important (and inevitable) role that prudential
considerations play in all exercises of judicial power, whether they be interpretive,
decisional, or remedial. “[N]o society . . . can fail in time to explode if it is deprived
of the arts of compromise, if it knows no ways to muddle through.”465 But there are
opportunities for courts to meter their involvement at every stage of the judicial
process,466 and the act of constitutional interpretation is no different.
One cannot extract practical judgments and extraconstitutional values from the
process of constructing doctrine. To borrow a phrase from Justice Scalia’s opinion
in Vieth, manageability turns out to be “root-and-branch” a matter of judicial
interpretation.467 And while practical virtues like administrability, clarity, and
predictability will inevitably shape the standards and rules that judges develop in the
process of deciding a case, there is no principled constitutional basis for allowing
these goals to eclipse the obligation to decide constitutional cases otherwise properly
before the judicial department.
B. Answering Rucho’s Questions
Viewing Rucho in this light reveals what has roiled the Court since the beginning.
Political gerrymandering does not present a hard question of constitutional
interpretation; it presents an easy question of constitutional construction.
The Justices never lacked the ability to articulate a standard for partisangerrymandering claims.468 Their debate was over the practical merits and political

462. See Scharpf, supra note 48, at 555–56 (“I am at a loss to see how either the Common
Law or American constitutional law could have grown and flourished if the courts had been
unable or unwilling to perform the creative functions which [the judicial-unmanageability
argument] so categorically disavows for them.”).
463. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2521 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
464. See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (“[W]e
cannot shirk [our] responsibilit[ies] merely because our decision may have significant political
overtones.”).
465. Bickel, supra note 44, at 49.
466. See supra Sections II.C, III.B.
467. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 285 (2004) (plurality opinion).
468. See id. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Quite obviously, . . . several standards for
identifying impermissible partisan influence are available to judges who have the will to
enforce them. . . . What is clear is that it is not the unavailability of judicially manageable
standards that drives today’s decision. It is, instead, a failure of judicial will . . . .”).
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risks of any standard they announced.469 By focusing on these questions—and setting
out certain doctrinal preconditions over time—the Court lost sight of its primary
obligation: interpreting what the Constitution commands.
1. The Interpretation Question:
Does Partisan Vote Dilution Violate the Constitution?
In Rucho, the Justices argued over a number of issues, but one question of
constitutional meaning was at the core of the case: does partisan vote dilution violate
the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, or Article I of the Constitution?470
Despite the central importance of this constitutional question, Chief Justice
Roberts skips right over it. Rather than analyzing and deciding whether it is
unconstitutional for state actors to dilute an individual’s vote for partisan advantage,
the Chief Justice simply assumes it is constitutional, at least to some extent.471 The
entire opinion starts from this premise and can be distilled down to four moves:
(1) “[A] jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering.’”472
(2) Thus, “[t]he ‘central problem’ is not determining whether a jurisdiction has
engaged in partisan gerrymandering. It is ‘determining when political
gerrymandering has gone too far.’”473
(3) “[I]t is only after determining how to define fairness that you can even begin
to answer the determinative question: ‘How much is too much?’”474
(4) “Deciding among . . . different visions of fairness . . . poses basic questions
that are political, not legal.”475
By starting with a conclusion about constitutional meaning, Chief Justice Roberts
avoids the act of judicial interpretation almost entirely and instead backs himself into
a question about political discretion.476 Where does this critical assumption—that
some partisan vote dilution is constitutional—come from? The answer is unclear in
Rucho (and, perhaps, was unclear even to Chief Justice Roberts), but it points us
toward the hidden barycenter of the partisan-gerrymandering debate: the practical
and political concerns about constitutional doctrine that warp the Court’s legal
inquiry into constitutional meaning.
For partisan-gerrymandering claims, two concepts are locked in orbit. The Court
assumes that some partisan gerrymandering must be constitutional (as a matter of

469. See infra Section IV.B.2.
470. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019).
471. See id. at 2497.
472. Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999)).
473. Id. (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 296).
474. Id. at 2501.
475. Id. at 2500.
476. See supra text accompanying notes 398–417 (discussing how the choice among
competing legitimate and nondiscriminatory theories of representation is a political decision).
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meaning) because of the practical consequences of any standard that would render
all partisan gerrymandering unlawful (as a matter of doctrine).477 Standards are then
deemed “impossible” to craft (as a matter of doctrine) because none can possibly
identify “how much is too much” (as a matter of meaning).
In other words, the difficult question about constitutional meaning (how much
intentional partisan dilution creates a violation?) only exists because Justice Scalia
created it based on an unjustified and unsupported assumption about constitutional
meaning (that some intentional partisan dilution does not create a violation).478 That
assumption is based solely on practical and political preconditions that the Court has
put in place for the kind of standards they would be willing to impose.479 And these
doctrinal preconditions are what preclude the Justices from ever honestly asking (or
even entertaining)480 the primary interpretive question: is partisan vote dilution
unconstitutional?
Rucho instead railroads this critical and profound question of constitutional law
and holds—for the first time and without any support, reasoning, or justification—
that the government possesses the explicit power to suppress the electoral influence
of those who hold political views disfavored by the party in power.481 This allows
the majority to skirt ever analyzing whether partisan vote dilution violates a
constitutional right and instead to shift immediately to analyzing what degree of
partisan vote dilution violates a constitutional right, a pivot used to undermine each
doctrinal option offered.482
Chief Justice Roberts does feign briefly toward precedent, pretending that the
primary interpretive question before the Court has already been answered.483 But this
is an empty rhetorical gesture for two reasons.
First, none of the case law Chief Justice Roberts cites actually establishes that
partisan advantage is a legitimate state interest in its own right.484 Each decision

477. See infra Section IV.B.2.
478. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 296.
479. See infra Section IV.B.2.
480. See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2497 (2019) (“Partisan
gerrymandering claims have proved . . . difficult to adjudicate. The basic reason is that . . . ‘a
jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering.’”) (quoting Hunt v.
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999)); id. at 2517 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]rue enough that
even the naked purpose to gain partisan advantage may not rise to the level of constitutional
notice when it is not the driving force in mapmaking or when the intended gain is slight.”).
481. See Parsons, Partisan Advantage, supra note 405, at 1138–47 (explaining how the
Court’s prior precedents only support political considerations in redistricting, not the pursuit
of partisan advantage). It is, perhaps, not surprising that such a corrosive and authoritarian
principle of constitutional law would make its first appearance in a way that is not explained,
justified, or reasoned—but simply assumed into existence. One can only hope it remains
confined to redistricting law.
482. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2502–03 (discussing how question of degree undermines
equal protection claim); id. at 2504–05 (discussing how question of degree undermines First
Amendment claim); id. at 2505–06 (discussing how question of degree undermines outlier
method). But see id. at 2506 (ignoring arguments posed and declining to analyze claim
altogether by recasting Elections Clause claim as a Guarantee Clause claim).
483. See id. at 2497–98.
484. See Parsons, Partisan Advantage, supra note 405, at 1138–47.

2020]

GER R Y MA ND ERI NG & JUS TI CIAB I LI TY

1351

simply acknowledges that political classifications and political concerns are
permissible in redistricting.485 For example, legislators may use political information
to craft competitive districts or to draw districts that mirror statewide political voting
strength.486 The cases cited by Chief Justice Roberts are consistent with the variety
of neutral, nondiscriminatory, legitimate theories of representation discussed
above.487 None of those cases, however, answer whether intentional partisan vote
suppression is lawful or legitimate,488 as Chief Justice Roberts (mis)represents.
Second, and more importantly, it would not matter even if prior dicta did support
what the Chief Justice suggests. The core question before the Rucho Court was

485. See id. at 1138–44.
486. See id. at 1139–43.
487. See supra text accompanying notes 398–415.
488. The Court employs a particularly well-rehearsed trope from the politicalgerrymandering debate when it conflates general partisanship with a specific intent to dilute
voting power on a partisan basis:
Unlike partisan gerrymandering claims, a racial gerrymandering claim does not
ask for a fair share of political power and influence, with all the justiciability
conundrums that entails. It asks instead for the elimination of a racial
classification. A partisan gerrymandering claim cannot ask for the elimination of
partisanship.
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2502 (2019). This passage contains so much
misdirection in so few sentences it is hard to imagine it could have been written in good faith.
First, racial dilution claims (as opposed to racial sorting claims) do protect a “fair share” of
power in the same way a partisan dilution claim would: prohibiting intentional dilution for an
invidious and discriminatory purpose. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982);
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980). The Court long ago reasoned its way out of
the paper bag of “proportional representation.” See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–66
(1973). “Rather than looking to proportional electoral outcomes, the Court looked to whether
[a] scheme interfered with equal electoral opportunities.” Parsons, Partisan Advantage, supra
note 405, at 1115. This allowed the Court to identify racial vote dilution without interpreting
the Constitution to guarantee racial proportionality. Rucho is written as though this entire body
of constitutional law does not exist. See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The Erasure of Racial Vote
Dilution Doctrine, ELECTION L. BLOG (June 28, 2019, 10:18 AM), http://electionlawblog.org
/?p=105855 [https://perma.cc/9A9N-7F2Y].
Second, racial sorting claims do not ask for the elimination of all racial considerations in
redistricting—just those that are not justified (e.g., used to confer racial advantage rather than
prevent racial dilution). See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 798
(2017).
Third, a partisan-gerrymandering claim does not ask for the elimination of partisanship any
more than racial gerrymandering claims ask for the elimination of racism. Instead, partisangerrymandering claims ask for the elimination of, or some restriction on, either (a) intentional
partisan vote dilution (akin to racial vote dilution claims) and/or (b) the elimination of an
unjustified partisan classification, such as partisan classification for partisan advantage (akin
to racial sorting claims). See Parsons, Partisan Advantage, supra note 405, at 1150–59.
General “partisanship” is easily distinguishable from a specific intent to burden, suppress,
or disfavor citizens under law based on their partisan preferences. General partisanship
involves a pitched battle to appeal to (or change) voters’ political preferences. Partisan dilution
involves an effort to insulate legislators from voters’ political preferences. See G. Michael
Parsons, The Institutional Case for Partisan Gerrymandering Claims, 2017 CARDOZO L. REV.
DE NOVO 155, 164 (2017) [hereinafter Parsons, The Institutional Case].
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whether partisan vote dilution violates the First Amendment, the Equal Protection
Clause, or Article I. The “reasoning” of the majority opinion rests from top to bottom
upon an assumption that begs that very question.489
The majority was not precluded from answering the constitutional question
because standards were unmanageable; standards were unmanageable because the
majority chose not to answer the constitutional question.490 The entirety of the Rucho
opinion places the doctrinal cart before the interpretive horse.491
All in all, Rucho represents a tragically missed opportunity. Had the Court
engaged the interpretive question forthrightly, it might have been surprised to find
the answer quite easy.
Does vote dilution inflict cognizable individual harm? Yes, as Gill unanimously
held.492 Do state actors violate the Equal Protection Clause or the First Amendment
if they inflict that harm based on political viewpoint for the purpose of suppressing
the influence of those who hold views disfavored by the state? The weight of the
doctrine would suggest a clear answer to this constitutional question as well: yes. 493
With that definitive constitutional right established, the Court could have then
moved to the “central question” of constitutional construction posed by partisangerrymandering claims: “how far is too far?”
2. The Construction Question:
What Is the Standard to State a Claim of Partisan Vote Dilution?
When courts design doctrine, they necessarily import practical considerations and
are constrained by institutional factors such as the workability of standards for
liability and enforcement.494 There is nothing uncommon about courts under- or
over-enforcing constitutional rights in the process of constructing administrable
constitutional law.495
A bright-line rule might encourage administrability but cause otherwiseactionable claims to fail.496 Or a bright-line rule might help prevent violations but

489. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Dirty Thinking About Law and
Democracy in Rucho v. Common Cause, 3 AM. CONST. SOC’Y SUP. CT. REV. 293, 302 (2019)
[hereinafter Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, Dirty Thinking About Law and Democracy].
490. See infra Section IV.B.2.
491. See infra Section IV.B.2.
492. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1931 (2018).
493. See generally Kang, supra note 405, Levitt, supra note 405, and Parsons, Partisan
Advantage, supra note 405. Even the state defendants before the Court the prior term conceded
that a statute expressly seeking partisan advantage would be unconstitutional. See Transcript
of Oral Argument at 26–27, Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (No. 16-1161) [hereinafter Transcript of
Oral Argument, Gill]; Transcript of Oral Argument at 45–47, Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct.
1942 (2018) (No. 17-333).
494. See Fallon, Judicial Manageability, supra note 445, at 1299; Lawrence Gene Sager,
Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1212, 1221 (1978).
495. Fallon, Judicial Manageability, supra note 445, at 1278; see Barry Friedman, When
Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735,
738–40 (1992).
496. See Fallon, Judicial Manageability, supra note 445, at 1298–1306.
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prohibit otherwise-legitimate state conduct in the process.497 In both cases, the
Court’s decision to adopt bright-line doctrine could be subject to critique for
effectively constricting the meaning of the right in one instance and functionally
usurping legislative or executive authority in the other.
Yet, whatever position one takes on the appropriate limits of constitutional
construction (if any), there is no inherent reason for the Court to behave any
differently when formulating a workable partisan-gerrymandering standard. Once
one accepts that a “manageable” standard does not need to track constitutional
meaning precisely,498 the decision to adopt a rough standard or a sharp rule can stand
on its own bottom. The Court need only provide reasoned justifications.
A bright line might help guide mapmakers, avoid frequent conflict between courts
and legislatures, and ensure judicial impartiality in appearance and in fact. A broad
standard might capture more violations, give legislators more room for negotiation
and compromise, and have more common-sense appeal to “the intelligent man on the
street.”499 These justifications can be animated by countervailing constitutional
principles, prudential concerns, or basic administrability. In every constitutional case
it decides, the Court picks among a countless range of virtues, values, and priorities,
baking whatever it chooses into constitutional doctrine. Only when confronted with
political-gerrymandering claims does the Court stare back blankly and ask, “but
what’s the recipe?”
The Court tried and failed to produce a standard for partisan gerrymandering over
the course of half a century not because the question of constitutional interpretation
was hard but because the question of constitutional construction was easy. Too easy.
If the question was “how far is too far?,” the answer was “well, how far do you
want?” The Court faced what Professor Seidman has called “the brute and
frightening reality of unmediated and uncontrollable choice.”500 With thousands of
local, state, and federal legislators across the political spectrum suddenly standing in
the kitchen, the Rucho majority blinked. Better to not cook at all than show everyone
how the doctrinal sausage is made.
Partisan-gerrymandering claims terrify the majority, not because they pose an
extraordinary question of constitutional complexity, but because they pose an
ordinary question of constitutional construction with extraordinary consequences.
Such claims are not unmanageable in any inherent, theoretical, or constitutional
sense. They have become unmanageable because the Court has made several
extraconstitutional policy demands over time that allegedly must be met—
preconditions before the Court is willing to do its constitutional duty.501 This has

497. See id.
498. See Fallon, Judicial Manageability, supra note 445, at 1283 (“[T]he Justices
participating in Vieth all appeared to assume that a judicially manageable standard—if one
could be devised—need not replicate the Constitution’s meaning precisely.”).
499. Transcript of Oral Argument, Gill, supra note 493, at 37.
500. Seidman, supra note 39, at 472.
501. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Intervention as
Judicial Restraint, 132 HARV. L. REV. 236, 240 (2018) [hereinafter Charles & FuentesRohwer, Judicial Intervention as Judicial Restraint] (describing the Court’s “reluctance to
intervene [as] a function of the Court’s institutional calculus that it ought to protect its stature
and institutional capital,” and explaining that “the debate over standing, jurisdiction, and
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resulted in an unusually rigorous (and ad hoc) threshold for finding a standard
“manageable” that the Court applies to partisan-gerrymandering claims alone.
To be acceptable, a partisan-gerrymandering standard must be clearly rooted in a
principled interpretation,502 provide common-sense appeal,503 result in infrequent
application,504 offer a bright-line administrable rule to avoid judicial entanglement,505
and avoid relying upon any particular notion of fairness.506 And, before any of this,
comes the Court’s reputation.507

judicially manageable standards is a red herring”).
502. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 288 (2004) (noting that a standard must be
“judicially discernible in the sense of being relevant to some constitutional violation”); id. at
295 (“This Court may not willy-nilly apply standards—even manageable standards—having
no relation to constitutional harms.”); id. at 312 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing
hypothetical statute expressly burdening “Party X” and noting that “we would surely conclude
the Constitution had been violated”); Transcript of Oral Argument, Gill, supra note 493, at
20–21 (“JUSTICE KAGAN: . . . [T]here are plenty areas of law . . . where we look at intent
beyond the face of a statute.”).
503. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Gill, supra note 493, at 37 (“CHIEF JUSTICE
ROBERTS: . . . [T]he intelligent man on the street is going to say [that an efficiency gap
threshold for determining constitutionality is] a bunch of baloney. . . . [and believe that] the
Supreme Court prefer[s] [one party] over [another].”).
504. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2498 (2019) (“In considering whether
partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable, we are mindful of Justice Kennedy’s counsel
in Vieth: Any standard for resolving such claims must be grounded in a ‘limited and precise
rationale’ . . . .” (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306–08 (Kennedy, J., concurring))); id. at 2515–
16 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[J]udges should not be striking down maps left, right, and center,
on the view that every smidgen of politics is a smidgen too much. Respect for state legislative
processes—and restraint in the exercise of judicial authority—counsels intervention in only
egregious cases.”).
505. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2498 (“An expansive standard requiring ‘the correction of all
election district lines drawn for partisan reasons would commit federal and state courts to
unprecedented intervention in the American political process.’” (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at
306 (Kennedy, J., concurring))); Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1490 (2017) (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing the “danger . . . that the federal courts will be
transformed into weapons of political warfare”); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 300–01 (“[T]he vaguer the
test for availability, the more frequently interest rather than necessity will produce litigation.”).
506. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500 (“Deciding among . . . different visions of fairness . . .
poses basic questions that are political, not legal.”); Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1933 (rejecting
asymmetry as a measure of “the effect that a gerrymander has on the fortunes of political
parties” rather than a measure of “the effect that a gerrymander has on the votes of particular
citizens”); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 288 (rejecting proportional representation as a constitutional
principle).
507. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 301 (“Is the regular insertion of the judiciary into districting,
with the delay and uncertainty that brings to the political process and the partisan enmity it
brings upon the courts, worth the benefit to be achieved—an accelerated (by some unknown
degree) effectuation of the majority will? We think not.”); Transcript of Oral Argument, Gill,
supra note 493, at 36–38 (“CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: . . . [T]he main problem for me [is
that these claims are] . . . going to cause very serious harm to the status and integrity of the
decisions of this Court in the eyes of the country.”).
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Any one (or handful) of these goals could provide a reasoned basis for adopting
one standard over another.508 Instead, they are cobbled together as a collective excuse
for inaction. Allowing the Court to place its doctrinal preferences above its judicial
obligations in this manner is irreconcilable with the rest of the Court’s Article III
jurisprudence and its fundamental conception of judicial supremacy and judicial
review.509
As Justice Stevens lamented in Vieth, “it is not the unavailability of judicially
manageable standards” that drove the decision in Rucho but, rather, “a failure of
judicial will.”510 A number of paths were available to the Rucho Court, any one of
which would have been more legally principled and more consistent with the
Supreme Court’s constitutional doctrines and practices than the unbridled and
standardless path taken in Rucho.
a. Purposeful Incrementalism
One path would have been to intervene in an incrementalist fashion, address the
cases before the Court with narrow opinions, and leave more concrete boundary
drawing for another day.511 The Supreme Court has long held that, when faced with
“perplexing questions,” the usual course is for judges “to confine [themselves] to
deciding only what is necessary to the disposition of the immediate case.” 512
For this approach, the Court could have held that the Constitution at least provides
redress when plaintiffs can prove “predominant intent” and “durable” effect.513 This

508. See, e.g., Fallon, Judicial Manageability, supra note 445, at 1289–90.
509. See supra Sections III.B., IV.A; cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 126–27 (1986)
(“[F]ocus[ing] on the perceived need for judicial review and on the potential practical
problems with allowing such review . . . in assessing justiciability would alter substantially
the analysis the Court enunciated in Baker v. Carr . . . .”).
Perhaps one could argue that declining jurisdiction under the modern doctrine is simply the
furthest point at the end of a spectrum of underenforcement. See, e.g., Fallon, Judicial
Manageability, supra note 445, at 1306–09. If the vast majority of constitutional construction
is already extraconstitutional, then complete and unfettered jurisdictional discretion seems like
an unavoidable extension of the Court’s broader unprincipled, prudential flexibility.
Needless to say, this is not the position staked out by Chief Justice Roberts. Rucho—like
almost all of the Court’s modern justiciability doctrine—purports to be grounded in the
Constitution. Once one steps back from the theoretical to navigate the Court’s existing secondbest principles and doctrines, Rucho simply fails on its own terms.
Moreover, there are good reasons to treat absolute nonenforcement based on a jurisdictional
interpretation differently than partial underenforcement based on a substantive interpretation.
First, unlike a completely theoretical “right” that is not enforced for jurisdictional reasons, a
“right” that occasionally has some real-world effect can at least be said to exist in some
tangible sense, even if that right lacks its conceptually maximal bite for substantive reasons.
Second, requiring the court to modulate its interpretations on the merits rather than meter its
intervention altogether arguably serves a broader rule-of-law function.
510. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
511. See Tushnet, supra note 57, at 1233 (citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 5, 9–14 (1999)).
512. Whitehouse v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 349 U.S. 366, 372–73 (1955).
513. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2502–04 (2019).
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would have vindicated the harms in the discrete cases before the Court and allowed
a standard to start forming without consensus about how far judicial intervention
should ultimately go. And by saying this far is “too far,” the Court could have started
developing a “significant body of law” in its traditional stepwise fashion.514
From a doctrinal perspective, such a standard (temporary or not) could have
encompassed multiple constitutional meanings. Perhaps only extreme
gerrymandering violates the Constitution. Or perhaps any meaningful amount of
intentional dilution violates the Constitution, but the relevant standard should only
reach egregious cases to give legislators breathing room and prevent judicial
entanglement.515 The Court need not choose between enforcing a right to its “full
conceptual limits”516 or denying that the right exists at all,517 especially from the
outset. Suppressive intent does not need to be blessed as constitutionally legitimate
to avoid every trace sign of partisan intent becoming constitutionally actionable.518
From an institutional perspective, starting with such a deferential standard and
signaling a willingness to work inward incrementally would have allowed actors on
all sides to self-regulate in response to unfolding events. State legislators, seeing the
potential for more aggressive judicial action on the horizon, might have curtailed
their most flagrant abuses.519 The Court meanwhile would have left open the
possibility of more stringent standards (or applications) as necessary without
precommitting to them.
Instead, Chief Justice Roberts acts as if all doctrinal questions must be answered
in one fell swoop—that the Court must provide, in Rucho, a rule clear enough to
resolve all gerrymandering cases for all time.
This is not consistent with the normal judicial mode, let alone a precondition for
judicial power. In reflecting on the virtues of an incrementalist approach, Chief
Justice Roberts might have considered the constitutional guidance of then-Circuit

514. Id. at 2506.
515. See id. at 2515–16 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[J]udges should not be striking down
maps left, right, and center, on the view that every smidgen of politics is a smidgen
too much.”).
516. See Fallon, Judicial Manageability, supra note 445, at 1299.
517. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2505 (expressing concerns that “a First Amendment claim,
if it were sustained, would render unlawful all consideration of political affiliation in
districting” (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. 267, 294 (2004)) (emphasis in original)).
518. See, e.g., id. at 2517 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (rejecting that “state officials’ intent to
entrench their party in power is perfectly ‘permissible’”); id. at 2516 (stating that “[r]espect
for state legislative processes—and restraint in the exercise of judicial authority—counsels
intervention in only egregious cases”).
519. As Professor Rick Pildes has pointed out, the internal logic of legal doctrine is not
“the only sourc[e] of stability and precision in law”—if political actors “face the proper
incentives, constitutional constraints can become self-enforcing.” Richard H. Pildes,
Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 66
(2004). For example, after the Supreme Court introduced the notoriously ambiguous Shaw
claim, “[S]tate legislators and other actors internalized the vague legal constraints of Shaw in
ways that generated a stable equilibrium.” Id. at 68. Ironically, the most enduring source of
instability and litigation with respect to Shaw claims over time was the lack of a partisangerrymandering claim to offset the incentives for boundary testing that remained.
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Judge Roberts: “[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide
more . . . .”520
b. Principled Clarity
Another path would have entailed a more assertive judicial intervention: enforcing
First Amendment and equal-protection principles to their full conceptual limit by
making any degree of intentional partisan vote dilution actionable. On this point, the
Rucho Court was unanimous: no one was willing to endorse such a rigorous
standard.521
Although no Justice endorsed such a firm, principled standard, it is not without
practical or institutional benefits. One benefit stands above all others: clarity. As
Justice Scalia once noted, “[g]ood fences make good neighbors.”522 If legislators
were told clearly and forcefully that they could not target citizens for suppression
based on their political beliefs, they would have a plain sense of what the law permits
and forbids. Such clear tests also do a better job of guiding lower courts.523
A principled clarity approach also has the benefit of common sense. The
“intelligent man on the street” may think it “a bunch of baloney” for the Court to
proclaim that a map is unconstitutional when it crosses some arbitrary numerical
threshold for measuring a map’s partisan asymmetry,524 but that same person will
surely understand if the Court proclaims that the Constitution forbids the government
from discriminating between citizens based on how they vote. The constitutional
gravity of this axiom is obvious, and one does not need a law degree to understand
that the general partisanship involved in persuading voters is different from the illicit
partisanship involved in suppressing voters.525
To be sure, applying basic free-speech and equal-protection principles to partisangerrymandering claims could have spurred a wave of litigation at first. The Court’s
own failure to apply these principles over the past half century encouraged unlawful
practices to accumulate, and clearing a backlog of statutes codifying invidious
behavior could take time.526

520. PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. D.E.A., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J.,
concurring).
521. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2498 (“An expansive standard requiring ‘the correction of all
election district lines drawn for partisan reasons would commit federal and state courts to
unprecedented intervention in the American political process.’”) (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at
306 (Kennedy, J., concurring)); id. at 2515–16 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[J]udges should not
be striking down maps left, right, and center, on the view that every smidgen of politics is a
smidgen too much. Respect for state legislative processes . . . counsels intervention in only
egregious cases.”).
522. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995).
523. See Grove, Vertical Maximalism, supra note 457, at 10–11, 44–45.
524. Transcript of Oral Argument, Gill, supra note 493, at 37.
525. See Levitt, supra note 405, at 2009–18; Parsons, The Institutional Case, supra note
488, at 160–65.
526. Of course, if the Court had acted in Rucho, any potential “wave of litigation” might
have been largely overtaken and obviated by the 2020 census. With every map in the United
States being revisited to ensure one-person, one-vote compliance, state and local officials
could have incorporated the Court’s partisan-gerrymandering compliance as well. See Parsons,
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Nonetheless, the most important long-term institutional question “is not how
many maps are challenged when the rule of law is announced, but how many maps
are challenged once the rule of law is settled.”527 The Court’s decisions occur at a
single point in time, but institutional actors throughout our democratic system react
and adjust to one another over the long run.
Consider, for example, “how ‘justiciable’ would First-Amendment issues appear
today if the process of interpretation and application had been halted in 1912?”528
Introducing “strict scrutiny” after a century-long free-for-all of viewpoint
suppression would have had a profound impact. The specter of large-scale,
aggressive judicial intervention might have resulted in a lesser standard being
adopted—or a stronger standard only being adopted over time. But the consequences
of constitutional compliance would hardly have justified declining to interpret or
apply the First Amendment at all.
c. Practical Clarity
Finally, the Court could have paired a firm commitment to constitutional
principles with a clear, predictable, and neutral administrable rule for legislators and
lower courts by employing a burden-shifting standard.
In its one-person, one-vote jurisprudence, the Court uses a ten percent totalpopulation deviation threshold to determine whether the burden of challenging or
defending a state legislative map rests with the plaintiff or with the government.529
This ten percent trigger has been so successful in encouraging mapmakers to steer
clear of litigation it is easy to forget that the Court’s actual standard of constitutional
liability remains far more amorphous: whether a state has “sacrificed substantial
equality to justifiable deviations.”530
In one-person, one-vote cases, the Court recognizes that legislatures should have
the freedom to pursue a wide range of legitimate redistricting policies but that (1)
these policies cannot be applied in a discriminatory fashion531 and (2) these policies,
“however rational, cannot constitutionally be permitted to emasculate the goal of
substantial equality.”532 As the Supreme Court has stated:
Neither courts nor legislatures are furnished any specialized calipers that
enable them to extract from the general language of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the mathematical formula that
establishes what range of percentage deviations is permissible . . . . While

The Institutional Case, supra note 488, at 176.
527. Id. (emphasis in original).
528. Scharpf, supra note 48, at 595.
529. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983).
530. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329 (1973).
531. See Brown, 462 U.S. at 844; Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983); Roman
v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964).
532. Mahan, 410 U.S. at 326.
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[a sixteen-odd percent population deviation] may well approach tolerable
limits, we do not believe it . . . sacrifice[s] substantial equality . . . .533
The Supreme Court has never definitively answered “how far is too far” under its
one-person, one-vote doctrine, but that does not make its decisions in individual votedilution cases “unreasoned” or its overall vote-dilution doctrine “unmanageable.”
By pairing a flexible-but-principled liability standard with a clear-but-qualified
presumptive rule, the Court has reaped the benefits of both. The burden-shifting
standard provides administrable guidance to legislators and courts, giving
mapmakers a method to avoid litigation. And yet, the burden-shifting standard also
resists the gamesmanship that might result from a safe harbor.534 The principled
liability standard, on the other hand, provides a commonsense and celebrated
constitutional doctrine that aligns with popular notions of fair play.
The Court could employ a similar approach to partisan gerrymandering, offering
a forceful declaration of constitutional principles and then adopting a burden-shifting
standard (from the outset or over time) to help streamline litigation and guide
mapmakers, judges, and voters. This would provide a practical rule to address the
Court’s construction concerns and a constitutional standard to fulfill its interpretation
concerns.
One tool in particular provided the Rucho Court an opportunity to meet all of these
needs: the outlier method.535 The approach identifies whether the challenged district
constitutes an extreme statistical outlier by using computing technology to randomly
generate a universe of maps that incorporate the state’s physical and political
geography and the legislature’s declared districting criteria and priorities (excluding,
of course, partisan advantage).536 This universe of nonpartisan maps (numbering in
the thousands, millions, or even billions) provides a distribution of electoral
outcomes one would expect from a nonpartisan redistricting process.537 One then
simply compares the challenged district to the range of outcomes one would expect
in the plaintiff’s district to determine whether the challenged district constitutes an
“extreme outlier.”538
Chief Justice Roberts offers only two objections to the outlier method, neither of
which survive even the briefest encounter with the Court’s one-person, one-vote
jurisprudence.
Before addressing these two objections, however, it’s worth highlighting two
arguments Chief Justice Roberts does not make about the outlier method. Chief
Justice Roberts does not claim that the outlier method constitutionalizes proportional

533. Id. at 329.
534. See, e.g., Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004) (mem.) (affirming the decision by a
district court to strike down a plan with a 9.98% population deviation).
535. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2518 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(referring to outlier method as the “Extreme Outlier Approach”).
536. See id. at 2517–18; see also Gowri Ramachandran & Dara Gold, The New
Redistricting Math: Establishing Fair Districts, in AMERICA VOTES!: CHALLENGES TO
MODERN ELECTION LAW AND VOTING RIGHTS 297, 303–11 (Benjamin E. Griffith & John
Hardin Young eds., 4th ed. 2020).
537. See Ramachandran & Gold, supra note 536.
538. See id.

1360

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:1295

representation (despite claiming earlier in the opinion that “[p]artisan
gerrymandering claims invariably sound in a desire for proportional
representation”).539 He does not because he cannot. Massachusetts, as Justice Kagan
points out, regularly elects an all-Democratic congressional delegation despite
roughly thirty-five percent of voters regularly casting ballots for Republicans.540 Yet,
because those voters are evenly spread across the state, an outlier analysis reveals
that “no valid districting plan whatsoever [would] have even a single Republicanfavoring district.”541 That is not due to partisan gerrymandering; it’s due to the
political geography of the state. In other words, it is not true that “[p]artisan
gerrymandering claims rest on an instinct that groups with a certain level of political
support should enjoy a commensurate level of political power and influence.”542 The
very case before the Court demonstrated that conclusively.
Nor does Chief Justice Roberts allege that the outlier method imposes a particular
“vision[] of fairness” upon politicians,543 depriving them of their legitimate
discretionary, legislative authority in redistricting. The outlier method uses
legislators’ own chosen discretionary criteria—their own “vision of fairness”—as its
baseline for measuring the impact of partisan vote dilution.544
Over the first twenty-six pages of the majority opinion, these two supposed
“flaws” are deemed so intrinsic to partisan-gerrymandering claims—all partisangerrymandering claims—that the whole category can be written off as forevermore
irredeemable and nonjusticiable.545 On page twenty-seven, the entire foundation of
that nonjusticiability opinion is revealed as demonstrably false.546
Rather than recognizing that its abstract musings about political-gerrymandering
claims are not tethered to the actual case before it—let alone any potential future
cases—the majority pivots to two new objections, specially tailored to the outlier
method.
First, Chief Justice Roberts contends that it is “indeterminate and arbitrary” to use
a state’s own redistricting criteria as a baseline because “different criteria could move
the median map toward different partisan distributions.”547 Thus, “the same map
could be constitutional or not depending solely on what the mapmakers said they set
out to do.”548
But the same is true of the one-person, one-vote doctrine. Legislatures are free to
advance any number of legitimate state redistricting policies that might result in some

539. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499 (emphasis added).
540. See id. at 2520–21 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
541. Amicus Brief of Mathematicians, Law Professors, and Students in Support of
Appellees and Affirmance at 25–26, Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (No. 18-422) (emphasis in
original).
542. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499.
543. Id. at 2500.
544. See id. at 2521 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
545. See Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, slip op. at 1–26 (U.S. June 27, 2019); see
also supra text accompanying notes 324–339.
546. See Rucho, slip op. at 27 (“The dissent proposes using a State’s own districting criteria
as a neutral baseline from which to measure how extreme a partisan gerrymander is.”).
547. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2505.
548. Id.

2020]

GER R Y MA ND ERI NG & JUS TI CIAB I LI TY

1361

degree of quantitative vote dilution so long as those policies “are free from any taint
of arbitrariness or discrimination.”549 Under this standard, “the same map could be
constitutional or not depending solely on what the mapmakers said they set out to
do.”550
Consider a state legislative map with a twelve percent total population deviation.
In one scenario, the state’s criteria claim to prioritize compactness, but the plaintiffs
come forth with thousands of alternative maps that do a better job maximizing
compactness with less population deviation. The map is unconstitutional. In another
scenario, the state’s criteria claim to prioritize keeping counties whole and, in fact,
no alternative maps do a better job of keeping counties whole while keeping
population deviations to twelve percent or less. The exact same map is now
constitutional based “solely on what the mapmakers said they set out to do.”551
Second, Chief Justice Roberts objects to using the outlier method for measuring
dilution because “it would return us to ‘the original unanswerable question (How
much political motivation and effect is too much?).’”552 Chief Justice Roberts floats
several options to prove his point: “Would twenty percent away from the median
map be okay? Forty percent? Sixty percent? Why or why not?”553
The answer is simpler than it sounds. If the question were “how much deviation
from the median map violates the Constitution,” then adopting a random, strict cutoff
might be troubling.554 But, if the question is “how much deviation from the median
map presumptively violates the Constitution,” then selecting any one of these
thresholds is no more problematic for partisan-gerrymandering claims than selecting
a ten percent threshold is for one-person, one-vote claims.
This distinction—between a principled and ambiguous liability standard and a
practical and administrable presumptive rule—also complicates Rucho’s attempt to
distinguish one-person, one-vote claims from partisan-gerrymandering claims on the
basis that “the one-person, one-vote rule is relatively easy to administer as a matter
of math.”555 Nothing could be further from the truth.
If Chief Justice Roberts means to say that the ideal of equal treatment is easily
identifiable under the one-person, one-vote doctrine (any map with zero percent
deviation), then so is the ideal of equal treatment in the partisan-gerrymandering
context (any map that produces outcomes consistent with the median map). If Chief
Justice Roberts means to say that the one-person, one-vote rule is easily
administrable because it provides a clear mathematical cutoff for presumptive
constitutionality (ten percent), then a clear mathematical cutoff for presumptive
constitutionality would do the same for partisan-gerrymandering claims (ten
percent).

549. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964).
550. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2505.
551. Id.
552. Id. (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296–97 (2004)).
553. Id.
554. See generally Jacob Eisler, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Constitutionalization
of Statistics, 68 EMORY L.J. 979 (2019) (identifying the dangers of metrical analyses becoming
“functionally constitutive of rights”).
555. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2501.
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If, however, Chief Justice Roberts means that the ultimate standard of liability for
the one-person, one-vote doctrine is clear, then he is sorely mistaken. Determining
“how far is too far” before constitutional liability kicks in under the one-person, onevote standard involves the same kind of complex, contextual, fact-dependent, and
indeterminate weighing of individual burdens and state interests that has vexed the
Court with respect to partisan-gerrymandering standards. Once beyond the ten
percent burden-shifting threshold, it’s entirely unclear what population deviation
“goes too far.” Twenty percent? Thirty percent? Why or why not? The answer
depends on the unique facts of the case and whether the legislature’s legitimate
policies have “sacrificed” or “emasculate[d]” the goal of “substantial equality.”556
The goal of “substantial equality” under the one-person, one-vote doctrine is no
more unmanageable than the goal of avoiding “substantial dilution” under a partisangerrymandering claim. And the Rucho opinion offers no principled, reasoned, or
constitutional basis for holding otherwise.
CONCLUSION
Rucho v. Common Cause will not stand the test of time. Its contradictions and
flawed reasoning are too plain;557 its constitutional tensions too deep,558 and its

556. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 326, 329 (1973).
557. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, Dirty Thinking About Law and Democracy, supra
note 489, at 293–94 (“Rucho is not an easy case to take seriously as doctrine. . . . Rucho deploys
a series of arguments against the justiciability of political-gerrymandering claims, relying on
no single argument and committed to nothing but the conclusion of non-justiciability.
Critically, the opinion is an amalgam of misdirections, distortions, and less-than pellucid
thinking about the constitutionalization of political-gerrymandering claims. This is what the
Court’s inexorable fealty to non-justiciability gets us.”); Sandy Levinson, Gibberish in
Supreme Court Opinions: Given that John Roberts Is Scarcely Stupid, What Explains the
Stupidity of Part of His Opinion in Rucho?, BALKINIZATION (July 10, 2019),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/07/gibberish-in-supreme-court-opinions.html [https://perma
.cc/5PN9-PHUF] (“[T]he serious question is whether John Roberts should be regarded as a
serious person when writing such drivel. . . . Roberts feels completely entitled—perhaps this
comes with the job—to offer pronouncements that, to put it mildly, are controversial among
the community that actually studies the empirics of our political system. . . . There is no reason
to take Roberts’s assertion[s] with any greater seriousness than the assertions of one’s
crotchety relative at Thanksgiving.”); Muller, supra note 389 (noting that Rucho is “heavy on
pragmatics and light on constitutional interpretation”).
558. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 312 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If
a State passed an enactment that declared ‘All future [redistricting plans] shall be drawn so as
most to burden Party X’s rights to fair and effective representation, though still in accord with
one-person, one-vote principles,’ we would surely conclude the Constitution had been
violated. If that is so, we should admit the possibility remains that a legislature might attempt
to reach the same result without that express directive.”); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,
569 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting) (“No one would deny that the equal protection clause would
also prohibit a law that would expressly give certain citizens a half-vote and others a full vote.
The probable effect of the 1901 State Apportionment Act in the coming election will be that
certain citizens, and among them the appellants, will in some instances have votes only oneninth as effective in choosing representatives to Congress as the votes of other citizens. Such
discriminatory legislation seems to me exactly the kind that the equal protection clause was
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implications for democracy too dire.559 Whatever the political question doctrine may
mean, the Rucho Court did not seem interested in resolving the legal question before
it “according to legal principles.”560
Perhaps the Chief Justice thought denying jurisdiction would help the Supreme
Court “stay above the fray.”561 But the Court is “in the fray” whether it recognizes
partisan-gerrymandering claims or not.562 And the Court’s inaction is not without
consequence.
Even if one gives Chief Justice Roberts the benefit of the doubt and assumes that
Rucho was written in good faith, the opinion’s manageability holding would still
appear doctrinally incoherent, historically aberrant, constitutionally questionable,
popularly indecipherable, and intellectually dishonest. But this is not even the worst
case for the Court. Many are unlikely to give the majority the benefit of the doubt, if
they read the opinion at all. And without any presumption of good faith to protect it,
the outcome in Rucho reeks of raw partisanship and institutional self-interest. In an
era when Republican appointees hold increasing control over judicial decisionmaking and Republican legislators have entrenched themselves in more states than
Democratic legislators, the “intelligent man on the street” might understandably call
“baloney” when he hears that partisan gerrymandering violates the Constitution but
that the Court has split down party lines over whether to do anything about it. This
is not an outcome that seems legitimate to a layperson—or even most lawyers.
If the Court is worried about constitutional fidelity, popular legitimacy, and the
principled exercise of judicial power, then doubling down on the modern political
question doctrine is not the answer. Whether Rucho was written in good or bad faith
is beside the point if it cannot be taken seriously on its own terms.563 The boundary
between the branches is forever shifting and contestable, and the judiciary relies upon
public trust to maintain its authority.564
When elections—the institution designed to resolve political conflicts—no longer
fulfill their primary function due to partisan manipulation, we should not be surprised
when that conflict moves to the courts. When the courts slam their doors shut along
partisan lines as well, it is not difficult to imagine where political conflict goes next.
Support for democratic institutions has been declining precipitously in recent
years,565 and the Court does not advance institutional legitimacy and stability by

intended to prohibit.”).
559. See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Causes and Consequences of
Gerrymandering, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115 (2018) (demonstrating how partisan
gerrymandering can severely distort representation and skew legislative outcomes without any
changes in underlying voter preferences).
560. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494 (emphasis in original) (quoting Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct.
1916, 1929 (2018)).
561. See Parsons, The Institutional Case, supra note 488, at 167; see also Charles &
Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Intervention as Judicial Restraint, supra note 501, at 259–60.
562. See Parsons, The Institutional Case, supra note 488, at 1647–69.
563. See supra note 557.
564. See Josh Chafetz, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 15–26 (2017).
565. See, e.g., Lee Rainie & Andrew Perrin, Key Findings About Americans’ Declining
Trust in Government and Each Other, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (July 22, 2019),
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foreclosing all avenues of democratic accountability (let alone by dismissively
waving them away as “an instinct”).566
Adopting a more historically, analytically, and precedentially sound approach to
the political question doctrine would have made the answers to the Court’s selfinflicted manageability conundrum clear. Judicial standards under the Equal
Protection Clause and the First Amendment are “well developed and familiar,” and
federal courts are more than capable of determining, “if on the particular facts they
must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious
action.”567 Gerrymandering for partisan advantage fits the bill.
When the state targets voters who hold disfavored political beliefs for electoral
suppression, the controversy should be “lift[ed] . . . out of the so-called ‘political’
arena and into the conventional sphere of constitutional litigation.”568 The Supreme
Court’s duty is then to interpret the Constitution, decide the cognizable case before
it, and remedy the violation through the most appropriate equitable means available.
Article III of the Constitution allows no more—and demands no less.

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/22/key-findings-about-americans-decliningtrust-in-government-and-each-other/ [https://perma.cc/M8HF-S5DC].
566. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2499 (2019).
567. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) (emphasis omitted).
568. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346–47 (1960).

